Human Capital And Corporate Strategy In The Competition For Talent

As far as the functions of the enterprise are concerned, every function is closely related to each other and is of great significance. However, if each function is dissected , it can be found that "human" is the key factor. From the view of the resource basis, the high-quality human capital is the source of the competition preponderance of the enterprise (Barney, 1991; Wright, Mcmaham & Me Williams, 1992). At present, faced with outer and inner pressure, Chinese enterprises should get rid of the previous negative human management system, and adopt the proper and effective motivation measures to attract and manage the talent for the purpose of creating a competitive atmosphere. This paper deals with the human capital, the contribution rate of human capital to economy growth and the talent competition strategy of the enterprise based on the human capital theory.Chapter 1, the author introduces the background and motive of the research, the relevant concepts of human capital, game theory and non-symmetry Information Economics and the structure of the paper.Chapter 2 is mainly about the contribution rate of human resource to economy growth, and offers the algorithms of determining the contribution share under different conditions of production function.Chapter 3 primarily studies the strategy analysis of talent competition based on the human capital theory. In the first part, I analyze the classical Markov Transional Matrices model and point out that it hasn't applicable completeness, then improve the model. The second part establishes the frame of strategy analysis of talent competition which is based on the human capital theory. The third part proves that: if the stuff's level of effort a isobservable, then (1) , and explains how toestablish the optimum contract under the condition of symmetry information and thecharacters which optimum contract should have. The fourth part proves:if the stuff's levelof effort a isn't observable, thenexplains how to establish the optimum contract under the condition of non-symmetry information and the characters which optimum contract should have, gives the reward and punishment measures that the enterprise should take on the employees. The fifth part analyses the influence on the motivation contract form other observable variables such as y, which is irrelevant to the stuff's level of effort a by establishing linear contracts s(m,y) = a + (3(m + yy) , proves if cov (m, y) ^0 ,then we can decrease the agent costs and enhance the accuracy of motivation by putting y into the contract. The sixth part presents the idea of human capital carbonization, gives a kind of model on the distribution of profit in enterprise which is based on the thought of human capital carbonization.