The Ownership Structure Of Listed Companies In China, Corporate Governance And Corporate Performance

Different ownership structure leads to different corporate governance, on which directly the enterprise performance is heavily depended. The practice of global enterprises has also proved that rational ownership structure is a forceful guarantee of effective corporate governance and satisfactory enterprise performance. By the comparison of the evolvement of west countries and China's ownership structure, we find out that the evolvement of China's listed firm's ownership structure is peculiar. The peculiarity of ownership structure and therefore the defects of corporate governance are analyzed. Furthermore the ownership structure of listed companies and their enterprise performance are studied. The results show that: (1) the ownership structure is negatively related to enterprise performance in state controlled companies, is not significantly related in corporate owned companies , and is positively related in companies whose ownership is relatively dispersal. (2) There is a distinct U shape curve relation between ownership centralization and enterprise performance. (3) The existence of corporation stockholders and state stockholders of the company do not significantly affect the enterprise performance. Based on the above results, it considers the structure of a few competitive corporation stockholders be a reasonable solution in the near future. Under this ownership structure, few corporation stockholders directly enter the Board that would result in better performance of the company. To realize this object, measures to optimize ownership structure such as reducing state-shareholdings, developing institutional investors, and planning employee-shareholdings are put forward in this paper.