Empirical Study Of Listed Companies Managers Remuneration Incentive And Its Incentive Intensity

Compensation incentive is the major faction in corporation governance, and is also the center content in the system of incentive restriction by management supervisors. This paper uses the public companies whose financial report was publicized in 2001 as research target, applies the method of demonstration to analyze the relativity that compensation level, compensation structure, money compensation and stock-keeping ratio of management supervisors in Chinese public companies with management performance, and tries to make an all-sided discussion about compensation incentive and incentive intensity of Chinese management supervisors, and provide a reference for further reform in the system of compensation incentive.At the first, this paper makes an analysis on the whole sample and makes a conclusion as follows: the compensation level of management supervisors in Chinese public companies is universally low, but raises evidently, and the gap between the compensation level of management supervisors and the wage level of employees increases; the compensation structure is not in reason and there is an unbalance in long-term and short-term incentive; the ratio of "zero compensation" and "zero stock keeping" is rather large, but the ratio of "zero compensation" decreases year by year and the ratio of "zero stock keeping" shows a tendency of increase; there is not a relativity between the annual money compensation and management performance, and there is an evidently slight relativity between stock-keeping and management performance. At the same time the paper makes clear that compensation incentive intensity of management supervisor mainly comes from the "longitudinal" and "transverse" comparison of compensation.Secondly, through the research on the special sample of public companies we found that: there is not an evident relativity between the corporation performance and the annual pay, stock-keeping of management supervisors who as both board chairman and part-time general manager; in the public companies carrying out annual pay system that the annual pay and stock-keeping of its management supervisors is larger than the average value of the whole sample, there is an evidently slightrelativity between annual pay, stock-keeping and management performance; the annual pay, stock-keeping of management supervisors who both receive salary and keep stock and management performance all pass the evident relativity test, and its diversified compensation incentive intensity is greatest compared with other compensation combination mode. The paper provides the material evidence that management supervisor should carry out annual pay system and diversified compensation structure through the demonstration analysis.At last, through the classified research on each factors that influences the compensation of management supervisors it shows that: scale of capital, character of vocation, area coverage, stock-keeping ratio of stockholder controlling stock etc can all influence the relativity between annual pay, stock-keeping of management supervisors and management performance.Therefore, in order to boost up the compensation incentive intensity of management supervisors, the key is to build up the system of diversified compensation structure, the system of sound performance assessment and the structure of normative and effective corporation governance.