On The Protection Of The Interests Of The Creditors And The Relationship Between Bank And Enterprise Reengineering

Creditors are the important stakeholders in the firm, it will form an effective controlling system when they take an active part in the corporate governance. The company law in our country has clearly stated to protect stockholders and creditors' legal rights and interests. But because of the "outer man" of creditor and "limited" character of company, their rights have always been deprived by other stockholders. As the main creditor of the enterprise , bank not only provides loan for the enterprise, but also take big risks .However, for many reasons , bank has little effect in the corporate governance, not only the bank's interests can not be protected , but also the corporate governance can not be improved effectively. Thus, how to protect creditors' interests and reconstruct a good relationship between the bank and enterprise become a major task for the business world, policy-making and academic circles.Based on the theories of financial, property rights and management, this dissertation systematically analyses the necessary of protection of the creditors' interests from the aspects of theory and practice by normal analysis and comparative analysis, and try to find out an approach to reconstruct a good relationship between the bank and enterprise from financial governance angle .The whole dissertation includes four parts.Firstly, the dissertation argues that financial theory, property rights, agent theory and law are the base of reasons for protecting creditors' interests.Secondly, this dissertation surveys the financial mode and the relationship between bank and enterprise in our country, points out that fiscal-dominated financing mode under traditional economic system leads to an unconstraint of debt, and argues that the essential of bank-dominated financing mode in the economic transition period is still controlled by the state, which results in an unbalanced financing system and high debt level of state-owned enterprises.(SOEs') Then the dissertation deeply probes into the cause of the financial structure of SOEs', and discovers that the cause is the "soft budget constraint", while soft budget constraint is caused by the administration employment system of SOEs' managers and the "common properties system "of state-owned bank and enterprise. They both lead to an aggravation of the relationship between bank and enterprise in the economic transitional period.Thirdly , the dissertation compares the international relationship modes between banks and enterprises on the point view of corporate control rights transformation in the corporate governance, argues that the international relationship modes between banks and enterprises have their own background, we can not indiscriminately imitate, whoever, we may use the experience for reference.Finally, the dissertation points out two conceptions for reconstruction of a good relationship between the bank and enterprise in our country.