Corporate Incentive Pay Model Selection | Posted on:2003-07-28 | Degree:Master | Type:Thesis | Country:China | Candidate:Y Zhou | Full Text:PDF | GTID:2206360095452833 | Subject:Economics | Abstract/Summary: | PDF Full Text Request | The separation of ownership and operation of modern firms builds up a principal-agent relation between stockholders and operators. Under asymmetric information it is necessary for the principal to set up a mechanism of incentive and constraint for the agent' s action. Designing an incentive and operative salary system which basic salary as it' s center is most important to attract core stuffs and bestir a great of employees. I am intended to discuss in theory that incentive mechanism' s structure should be optimized. Combining with enterprise management practice, I design our country' s incentive salary modes that can be chosen by enterprises. | Keywords/Search Tags: | incentive mechanism, contractible, imperfection, principal-agent system, Value of Human Capital, Employee Stock, Option yearly salary, Incentive Compatibility | PDF Full Text Request | Related items |
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