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Enterprise Sovereignty Model Study

Posted on:2003-09-09Degree:MasterType:Thesis
Country:ChinaCandidate:H Q XiaFull Text:PDF
GTID:2206360095951965Subject:Industrial Economics
Abstract/Summary:PDF Full Text Request
In our country, the reform of most governmental enterprises adopted the ways of government control the share or government self- supporting. Practice prove, this reform way not only can't improve the governmental enterprises' efficiency but also bring the agency problem of inner- persons out control seriously. From the angle of the firm residual power in ruling, the firm of the transitive stage take on the characteristics of un- institutioal firm dominion: the inner- persons manage the firm asset randomnessly by the agent condition and the ruling residual power that they having handholded. The un- institional firm dominion resulted from the possession of governmental enterprise reform unthorough and the mechanism of constraint power of principal person unestablished. So the contradict phenomenon that the administrative and firm organ have powerful controllable power to agent outwardly but feebleness in fact arised. Presently, our market condition is disaccomplished. The outer mechanism of harness to firm is invalid. So Under the surrounding, contrasting to the westen firms, the agency problem is severe in our firms rationally. Presently, there have two models of harness mechanism to agency problem in the firm. One is the market control model in British and American, the other is the organ control model in German and Japan. The firm harness model is the well- balanced result of its connected conditions. It's forming and evolution is effected by macro- system, history, culture, law and economy. That which model will be dominative is decided by the conditions of market resource and organ resource. From the angle of firm's residualpower share, we can name the market control model shareholder dominion in British and American and name the organ control model firm dominion in German and Japan. Comparative to the shareholder dominion, in the firm dominion, The incentive for the agent(CEO) is scant, but the effect of its harness is not badly. There are tow reasons. One is that in the firm there has the mechanism of organ control directly. The other important mechanism is that the agent (CEO) the firm in high degree. The agent (CEO) and firm form a high exit cost relationship that contained the CEO's dealing of opportunism. This has enlighten sense partly for accomplishing our firm dominion in the transitive period.The market resources in China are lacking. The condition tell us that reconstruct the relationship of the agent with the firm and reinforce the control power of firm have the comparative advantage for accomplishing the harness mechanism of the firm dominion in the transitive period. Here we are not deny the importance of market mechanism to harness to harness the agency problem. Continue to accompish the market cordition is still our important work to do. On present stage, developing the exchange market of property rights has it singularity sense.Comparative to the institutional firm dominion, the firm in the transitive period has more sever agency problem and the organ control power is invalid. The main reason is that the body of property rights in the firm hasn't established and the constraint mechanism of proprietary rights is invalid. So the necessity to accomplish the harness mechanism of firm dominion in the transitive period is to embody the firm property rights and letproperty rights clear and definite. If the necessity will be realized, I think, to resolve these problems is key. (1) Multipolarize the share of the firm, enforce the constraint of the proprietary rights. We can create the new body of property rights in the firm to dilute the property rights belongs to the government. That will optimize the share structure in the governmental enterprises and to establish the management and possession system of entrepreneur. (2) Abolish the institution that appointing the manager by government. Appoint and Prompt the manager through the market mechanism. The personnel system that the managers appointed the by government but work in the firm will lead to these phenomenon: the unqulified man...
Keywords/Search Tags:agency problem, market control, organ control, firm dominion, inner- person out control, public domain
PDF Full Text Request
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