Study On Accounting Information Disclosure Of Listed Companies In China

Information disclosure is the core of Securities Market, and its present low quality has impeded the efficiency of capital resources allocation greatly. Hence solving the problems existing in accounting information disclosure and improving its quality has great meanings. As regards present situation, there are still much weakness on quality and quantity in information disclosure. The purpose of this thesis is to solve this problem and propose some methods and suggestions. The thesis is composed of five chapters. Chapter one is about summary of accounting information disclosure. In order to understand the historical evolution and main characteristic and principle of disclosure of information more clearly, and offer some foundation for the further study, the inductive method is introduced to analyze the accounting goals and the feature of the accounting information quality and so on. The thesis adopts the theoretical method of modern finance and information economy and puts forward to the importance of the information disclosure from three aspects including the hypothesis of effective market, asymmetric information and the theory of game. Chapter two analyzes the economic theory on the accounting information disclosure of listed corporations. Firstly, the author introduces the hypothesis of effective market and believes the Chinese security market tends to be a weak effective market and that it is urgent to strengthen the construction of standard information disclosure. Secondly, the author analyzes market failure due to asymmetric information, adverse selection, and moral hazard. There are three methods to solve the asymmetric information. One is that the supervisors should take effective measures to work out the public contract on accounting information disclosure. Another is that accounting information should be fully disclosed and controlled strictly. The third one is that some rules should be made to prevent fake accounting information disclosure. In chapter three, the author analyzes the factors influencing accounting information disclosure. Then the mechanism of the accounting information disclosure and function are discussed. Based on the above mentioned, the suggestion on standard accounting system of security market. Firstly, the incentive of users' external demand for information is to improve the reasonableness of economic strategy and to evaluate the performance of managers. The effect of accounting information disclosure depends on three factors involving: groups for information, the reaction system of accounting information disclosure and the power of information users. Secondly, managers have exerted strong influence on accounting information disclosure as the only supplier of accounting information because of separated ownership and managing rights under the modern system. There are many factors affecting the behavior of supply: internal incentive for corporate, the cost of accounting information disclosure (the cost of information, the cost of competition disadvantage, the cost of behavior control and the political cost. Lastly, the suggestion on the system of accounting ID, accounting criteria and auditing system is discussed to standardize accounting information disclosure. In chapter four, the author analyzes the main problems existing in security market in China. There are four reasons for fake accounting information disclosure: the fake information disclosure on relevant business, the fake information disclosure on income, the fake informationdisclosure on asset allocation and the fake information disclosure on the changed accounting method of checking and evaluating. Based on the above discussion, the author points the reasons for fake accounting information disclosure of listed corporations. In chapter five, the author analyzes the measures to standardize accounting information disclosure of listed corporations from three aspects. The first one is to improve supervision on accounting information disclosure, the second one is to better the participants of information disclosure, t...