Review Of The "rule Of Recognition"

As the criteria to distinguish between legal and non-legal propositions, the rule of recognition is the core of Hart's legal philosophy. It also forms the foundation of the legal system posed by Hart which is a unique combination of the two sets of rules. However, being discussed dispersedly, the concept of the abstract rule has been confusion. The writing purpose of this paper is to make a clear, comprehensive and accurate exposition of the content and features of that concept. By exposing the two debates between Hart and Dworkin and between Coleman and Dworkin which concern the rule of recognition, this paper also reveals the evolution of the rule of recognition. On this basis, the author gives a comprehensive analysis containing limitation and contribution of the concept. In the eyes of this writer, the Limitation lies in the fact that whether Hart or Coleman, they both fail to repulse fundamentally the academic challenges proposed by Dworkin. However, we should also recognize the theoretical significance of the concept. Hart's "rule of recognition" exceeds Austin's "sovereignty" and Kelsen's "basic norms", reflecting superior research perspective and analysis methods. To our legal research, the rule of recognition gives following two inspirations. First, I believe that the rule of recognition cannot be regarded as a rule, which do not meet the legal reality Hart wants to describe. Our legal research should learn this lesson and make efforts to use concept prudently and define legal concept with scientific and reasonable attitudes. Second, the purpose of the rule of recognition is to explore how to identify legal rules. This is a very important fundamental question of law. The "justice perspective" of the concept provides a good reference to our research on this issue.