| This paper mainly concentrates on the moral hazard of collective money trust, which is that the trustee may undermine the investors'interest. It analyzes the emergence of moral hazard by both internal and external causes and different theoretical perspectives, compares different solutions to the problem of moral hazard, proves that it is inevitable and reasonable for the civil law system to adopt the legislative model of strengthening the trustee's duty, and finally give some proposals on how to regulate the three types of moral hazard from the perspective of strengthening and improving the trustee's duty.In addition to introduction and conclusion, this paper consists of four parts. It follows the logical order "to ask questions——to analyze the reasons——to provide the solutions". The arguments focus on the inevitability and rationality of strengthening the trustee's duty in civil law system. Thus, it is necessary to strengthen the trustee'duty as the solution to the moral hazard of collective money trust.Based on the brief introduction of collective money trust, ChapterⅠputs forward the problem of moral hazard, which is that the trust companies probably undermine the investors'interest. Because of its unique flexibility, collective money trust has good prospects for development in China. However, the exposure of scandals led to the loss of investors'trust and confidence in the trust company. In practice, the moral hazard is mainly divided into three categories: frequent occurrence of Affiliated Transactions, neglect of diligence, inadequate information disclosure.ChapterⅡprovides the analysis of internal and external causes of moral hazard in the collective money trust. As to the internal causes, the analysis of principal-agent theory, incomplete-contract theory and transaction-cost theory shows that the trustee has superiority over consigner. Moreover, the legal analysis shows that the trustee should bear more obligations. In the analysis of external factors, incompatibility of the institution is also due to lack of culture and moral support, while the imperfect institution allows the trustee to shirk the external legal control.ChapterⅢargues that it is inevitable and rational for civil law system to strengthen the trustee's duty, which provides the solution for the fourth chapter. Both the legal systems treat the trustee as the core of the institution, and adopt the way of strengthening the trustee's duty to resolve the moral hazard. The common law system adopts fiduciary duty to regulate the trustee, and requires the trustee to serve the best interests of the beneficiaries; owing to the tradition, civil law system can copy the legal mode of common law system, so it has the necessity and rationality to strengthen the trustee's duty in legislation.On the basis of previous arguments, ChapterⅣputs forward the method of strengthening and improving the trustee's duty to regulate moral hazard of collective money trust. As to the control of Affiliated Transactions, trust companies should expand the disclosure scope of affiliated parties, and inform the pricing of Affiliated Transactions in detail. As regards neglect of diligence, the trust company should assume the liability of professional trustee, so that it can not only meet the skill standards of professional manager, but also ensure that their management of the trust property to achieve the goal as it claims. For the problem of inadequate information disclosure, trustee should bear more obligation of recording, reporting and accounting. At the time of establishment and issuing, the trustee should adequately disclose to investors the risks of the trust plan in order to ensure that investors make the right decisions. In addition, the trustee should adopt various ways of communication and strengthen continued information disclosure.At the end is the conclusion, which is the summary of views. It makes a brief review of analysis and arguments, and gives some proposals on how to solve the moral hazard of the collective money trust. |
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