Listed Company's Equity Incentive Theory And Practice

The separation of ownership rights from control rights brings forth the principal—agent problem between the tangible assets provides (the principals) and the intangible assets provides (the managers). In general, the owner's objective is different from the manager's. The corporate owner needs to establish the incentive and obligation mechanism, which can align the interests of the manager with shareholders, to supervise and motivate the manager. All constitute the core units of the theory of the firm. Moreover, the incentive mechanism of the operator is the key factor for our stated-owned enterprise reform. The government has adopted many kinds of incentive mechanism of the listed company, though the result is not very good in practice. So how to establish the incentive mechanism to encourage the manager to make them work hard for the owner's interests and improve the performance of the listed corporation is a very important task of research to the Chinese scholars at present.The incentive stock option mechanism, which aimed to arouse the operator's enthusiasm has, in recent years, become the heated topic for the stated-owned enterprises operator's frustration. And, in the incentive stock option mechanism, carrying out it as an experiment unit is a beneficial attempt in China, though many questions exist in the design and the implementation, and the anticipated result hasn't yet been achieved. In this article, an empirical analysis between the operator's compensation and the corporate performance in listed corporations form 2001 to 2003.some new suggestion of environment about the stated-owned enterprise's reform, and I hope that can inspire the manager better in practice.The problem of the operator's incentive mechanism is the core of the theory of the film. First of all, the theoretical foundation of the incentive mechanism has been discussed. In this chapter, I resort to the principal—agent theory and the theory of the property rights of human capital, which belong to the theory of the modern corporation. So the incentive mechanism for the operator should be established in our country, supporting in the theory for the implementation of the incentive stock optionin the listed company.On the basis of the theory, the main models of the implementation about the incentive stock option mechanism has been listed. And compared to the American incentive mechanism model, there are many flaws in the incentive stock option mechanism of China.The incentive stock option mechanism make the operator's compensation and Enterprise Performance together, which is an important mechanism about the incentive compensation .In this paper, an empirical analysis based on the datum of 1037 Chinese Listed Companies from 2001 to 2003,find that the incentive stock option mechanism of China has no role of the reform in the Chinese's companies. As stated above, it should be wise to implement the incentive stock option, and to improve the incentive stock mechanism of the operator's of listed company.