Research On The Stock Option Incentive Effects Of Listed Companies In China

With the continuous improvement and development of the enterprise system， the mostimportant characteristics of modern corporate governance is the separation of ownership andmanagement. This separation feature led to the rise of principal-agent costs， corresponding totake a lot of policy institutional arrangements for such a problem. In which listed companies forexecutive implementation of equity incentive system has been subject to widespread concern inacademical and practical.Concerning the actual conditions， this paper has a positive discussionon the incentive system of the Listed Companies in China， which is on the basis of theoreticaland empirical analysis， and to reveal the profound significance of equity incentive mechanismsfor corporate governance，and put forward the new ideas of optimization design.Firstly， base on the principal-agent theory， this paper analyse the theoretical base ofequities incentive in Chinese listed companies， then describe the status， trend and problems ofthe stock option incentive. Secondly， the following part of this paper certify the theoreticalanalysis with nonlinear multiple regression test， which initially confirmed the importance of theimplementation of equity incentive system in China’s listed companies.The last two parts first summarized the theoretical and empirical research of this paper，then concluded that corporate governance structure， market environment and professionalmanager market are the three important aspects to solve the problems when implementatingequity incentive system in our economy. Last， this paper listed self-limitation and broadly trendin this research area.