Commissioned By The Moral Hazard Problem In The Agent System

For the longterm efficiency of enterprise that develops and raises enterprise internal resource disposition , two rights split to become the important feature of modern enterprise. It is scattered that ownership becomes to be, shareholder does not have to participate in experience, knowledge and the influence of high stratum management, so the manager position of a lot of companies beginning from the operation of salary expert take charge of. These manager people do not be the shareholder of enterprise , have been represented the board of directors of owner merely because of their management ability to employ. Their management operation of short period moves about, also decide for a long period strategic policy.Ownership and right of administration split the direct consequence that caused is entrustment — agency problem produce. Have entrustment — agency relation, there is agency cost. Between the both sides of agency by agreement because of existence information asymmetrical , contract not complete, goal not uniform etc. reason, can often produce countrary and the morals risk of agent to option problem, make it can not develop business completely according to the benefit requirement of trustee.The negative role of morals risk shows mainly, is in some following aspects: Increase the influence and probability that incident occurs unsuccessfully the optimum disposition of resource , cause inefficient. In a perfect company administers structure, must want to have elaborate design encourage mechanism, to the contradiction between coordinative owner and manager, make the goal benefit trend of two consistent , guide manager with pursue shareholder value it is biggest to be goal. Well developed encourage mechanism must emphasize encourage effect for a long period.What the enterprise of our country now use encourage measure for a long period, usually have stock option , employee hold share planned, stock increment right and fictitious stock as well as management level purchase etc., them source in the West, and a common defect is them have considered profit only , and do not consider risk, also namely these encourage measure have emphasized for manager encourage have overlooked corresponding restraint. It is a pair of antagonistic and unified organism to encourage treaty bundle. Encourage treaty bundle too much , can increase the agency cost of trustee. Therefore this paper put forward two suit the national conditions of our country encourage mechanism for a long period: One is stock option, its purposeis to encourage enterprise manager with raising share price ( shareholder rights and interests biggest melt) is operation goal. 2 is that fictitious employee holds share plan, this plan is helpful to form the mechanism " inside is manual operated to make internal person" and solve internal manual operated system problem , so reaches perfect enterprise to administer structural purpose.