Power Plant Investment In China Into The Timing And Location Choice Game

At the background of deregulation reform of electricity market and electricity shortage, many kinds of investors have entered into generation market, and they focus on the investment decisions, while it is unavoidable that the investors 'behavior will have a effect on the aim of electricity reform and the sustainable development of electricity industry.This paper mainly analyzes the investment timing of electricity plant and location choice using game theories. As to the game analysis of entry timing, it mainly analyzes the impaction of administration's intervention on entry timing, and draws the conclusion that under the situation of electricity shortage, administration's excess intervention will induce preemption behavior, and even make excess entry problem. As to the analysis of location game, under different transmission capacity constraint, this paper analyzes the location choice of two investors, combined with the real conditions of our country, this paper draws the conclusion that there comes the excess entry of plant investment to high demand locations when there is no regulation on plant investment, and it also educes that through systems stimulation, we can enhance the probability of investing on low demand location. Corresponding to the above analysis, this paper also analyzes the behavior among local government and investors, bringing forward the reason of low level and out-of-order investment and excess entry . Finally, this paper puts forward the advice and policies of improving electricity investment actualities and pushing electricity market reform from the systems of electricity investment and financing and regulation systems.