| Controlling shareholders often trench on listed companies in many countries. Recently, this sort of question is very intractable in our country. Relational departments apply themselves to solve the question at all times, but the result didn't satisfy us. In order to restrain the embezzlement of listed companies, China Securities Regulatory Commission and State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission of the State Council promulgated "the notice of the criterion between listed companies and their associate companies ". How to control the embezzlement has become an urgent problem. Because the securities business was initiated late in China, the academe has not researched it comprehensively and profoundly. This paper gives an analytic demonstration on the relationship between stock proportion and the embezzlement. The study is composed of three aspects, the first is the relationship between the controlling shareholders and their embezzlement, the second is the relativity between the intendance of 2-10 shareholders, and the third is the relativity between the restriction of the foreign capital shareholders and the organizational shareholders and the embezzlement. We made statistical analysis and simplex analysis, and we constituted a multiple regression model and analyzed it. The result indicated that from 2002 to 2004, the embezzlement was not alleviative. The state shareholders trench on listed companies more severely than the non-state shareholders. The controlling shareholders' stock proportion is not linear correlation with the embezzlement. 2-10 shareholders' stock proportion is negative correlation with the embezzlement. The restriction of the foreign capital shareholders and the organizational shareholders reacts in different degree. The study result either make clear that we can gain the best stock proportion from the angle of restricting the embezzlement. This provided us some thoughts using stock reform. |
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