Stock Proportion Restriction, Capital Structure And Agency Costs

Since Berle & Means (1932) put forward the "separation of corporate ownership and control" of this important proposition, the study of the conflict of interests between shareholders and managers has become a hot topic. Especially when Jensen & Meckling (1976 ) initiated the public's analysis of agency costs and agency costs given the classic definition, the scholars extending their research by pivoting around the way that reduce agency costs, agency costs of measurement, agency costs and other factors . But with the continuous accumulation and in-depth study proceeding, theoretical basis, research focus and research methods, have subjected a series change, the research scholars believe that the focus of corporate governance should not be limited to the issues between shareholders and managers agency. More attention should be paid onto those of conflicts of interest between major and minor shareholders.Jensen & Meckling (1976) introduced the agency cost theory of capital structure into the company's analytical framework, pointing out the existing corporate agency conflict: conflicts between managers and shareholders , conflicts between managers and creditors . Between shareholders and creditors, agency issues would lead to less use of debt financing, More equity financing and more free cash flow will increase as the management and shareholders, and the conflict between the optimal capital structure is the two agents the result of trade-off between cost and also the lowest cost on the agent. Ownership structure of listed companies in China generally show features of the "Big Stock", controlling shareholders control the company's core power, with its final decision on the financing preferred capital structure of listed companies, but also determines the controlling shareholder and minority shareholders, creditors, agent relations, corporate governance in different ways according to the financing structure can be divided into equity financing governance and management of two types of debt financing. Whether equity or debt management governance, which aims to protect the interests of investors are not subject to abuse, reduce agency costs, the company for efficient management.This article relies on technology projects in Sichuan Province soft science "split share structure reform of listed companies after the ultimate controlling shareholder, ownership concentration and Firm Value" (08RKX0045), to the real estate category listed companies in Shenzhen and Shanghai (A shares) four consecutive years from 2005 to 2008, data as samples from the listed companies in China's real estate industry and the balance degree of ownership concentration and the present situation of the capital structure, empirical analysis and normative analysis using the combination method, the real estate listed companies check the degree of equity, capital structure on agency costs of research.Specific empirical study, the first use of statistical software SPSS13.0 406 samples of data to describe the company's overall statistical analysis, the initial description of the real estate listed companies the largest shareholder stake, equity restriction, company size, asset-liability ratio of the overall distribution. And then by multiple linear and curvilinear regression, analysis of the results of these initial depth of the regression analysis to the theoretical assumptions as before, to provide more general significance in the statistical analysis process and results more accurate and reliable statistical test .The results show that: 1,China's real estate listed companies, the equity balance degree and the cost was significantly correlated. Real estate industry, the second largest shareholder position relative to the ten largest shareholders, super power, the higher the degree of checks and balances equity, and agency costs are not lower but higher. 2,the impact of debt on agency costs have two sides. Asset-liability ratio management fee rate and negative correlation, indicating the debt as an incentive and control mechanisms, can reduce the shareholders and managers due to a conflict of interest arising between the agency cost of debt rate and occupancy rate of fund positive correlation is that debt can also lead to shareholders and creditors, shareholders and managers a conflict of interest between the new, over-current liabilities increase available cash flow, which listed on the major shareholders take up a stimulus funds, an increase of business the total agency costs. 3,Listed Companies of China's real estate debt financing does not play its lower agency costs of management effectiveness, debt may lead to controlling shareholders and creditors and inconsistencies between the interests of minority shareholders, such as controlling shareholders choose asset substitution led to excessive investment, transfer to the creditors risk; or through the "tunnel effect" Misappropriation of funds, and do not need to be responsible directly to the debt, creditors and severe loss of small shareholders. 4,the real estate listed companies in China, the company size and overhead rates and financial occupancy rate was a significant negative correlation. Illustrates the larger real estate companies, service consumption for the manager who played a very good monitoring agent problem effect on the behavior of large shareholders funds have also been occupied to some extent constrained, and large companies to effectively balance the interests of stakeholders conflict, thus reducing agency costs.