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Listed Company Incentive Theory And Empirical Research

Posted on:2006-08-05Degree:MasterType:Thesis
Country:ChinaCandidate:L R YanFull Text:PDF
GTID:2209360185967062Subject:Quantitative Economics
Abstract/Summary:PDF Full Text Request
With our country socialistic market economy system and the modern enterprise system being more and more sound, the researching motivating mechanism has become one of the most debating problems in corporate governance theory. Recently, the mechanism on how to incent executive seems not effective, and this causes some problems such as "executive short-term behavior" and "internal person control". Therefore, building up a motivating mechanism which keeps up with the situation of our country will be full of theoretical meaning and realistic meaning to the enterprise developmento This paper makes a study on incentive executive according to the entrust-agent theory and the game theory, and then makes an empirical study on motivating operator according to the listed of our country company annual report data.At first, the target of entrustment-agent theory is to design a contract which makes the client (proprietor) be able to prize and punish agent upon the observable information. Because the incumbency consumption seizes the enterprise resources very serious, so this paper investigated the incumbency consume and the executive risk how to the influence the design of motivating mechanism.Secondly, this paper analyzes executive behavior based on game theory. The results express: no matter what kind of information they have, as long as the proprietor and the executive are in a game, there will always be a chance for the proprietor to take a strategy of no supervision and the executive to pursue self-interest maximized. If the executive and proprietor repeated the game, the executive will pursue the farsighted benefits and the company value maximized way.Then, this paper makes a descriptive analysis of 937 listed companies' annual reports of our country in 2004. The results discover: The obvious profession difference and region difference between the listed company executive rewards; The executive holds a quantity less and "zero hold" phenomenon severity. We make empirical study of 281 listed companies annual report data in 2002, 2003, 2004. The...
Keywords/Search Tags:Executive, Entrustment-agent theory, Incentive contract, Game theory
PDF Full Text Request
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