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Research On Some Issues Of The Formation Mechanism And Coordination Management About Airline Alliance

Posted on:2009-03-30Degree:DoctorType:Dissertation
Country:ChinaCandidate:J WenFull Text:PDF
GTID:1119360272978515Subject:Transportation planning and management
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The airline strategy alliance is a kind of operation pattern being related to many airlines. In airline alliance, the airlines activity is not that one kind of simple linearity overlays process, but is dynamic, complex, the non-linear integrated process. This kind of characteristic has decided that the operation organization and management of airline strategy alliance is complexity and polytropy. The theory research and managing practice of airline alliance are indicated that the problems such as partner selection, profit distributing, risk control, incentive contract is exist during the constructing and operation managing of airline alliance. Therefore a system and further research on airline alliance is of great importance theoretically and realistically.In this dissertation, on the basis of some theory such as modern management thory, systems engineering theory, principal-agent theory, thinking of the characteristic of airline strategy alliance,we make research on the the method of game theory, fuzzy mathematics, gray appraisal method, entropy weight. The research is made as following:1. Research on the formation motive of the airline allianceOn the basis of the retrospection of the fundamental concept and form, the basic concept is put forward and the form of the airline alliance is introduced. Then the contrast analysis with the general alliance form has made. The five characteristics of airline alliance are discussed. On the grounds of analyzing the environmental variation factor about the airline self and outer, the formation motive of the airline alliance is divided into the external drive factor and internal actuation factor.2. Game Analysis of global airline strategy allianceThe game model of payment matrix about the behavior of cooperation and competition of the airline alliance is set up. The behavior cooperation and competition behavior of the airline alliance is analyzed. The global airline industry has the characteristics of scale economy and oligopoly based on the analyzing entering and withdrawing barriers and cost structure and fixed assets specificity. The Cournot model and Stackelberg model of duopoly market of the global airline industry are set up. This result is that the global airlines through strategic alliance seek for the maximum profit, and this tendency will continue.3. Study on selection of cooperation partners in the airline alliancesPartner selection is the key to successful airline strategic alliances, and is animportant and complex decision problem. In this paper, a new algorithm is put forward. First, the fuzzy comparison matrix and the criteria weight vector are given in the light of analytic hierarchy process(AHP). And the modifying method of the pairwise comparison gauge was presented according to the agility of airline alliances and the specific market demand. Then the optimal solution is acquired in terms of the sequence result of objective function. Finally, an example demonstrates the validity of the algorithm.4. Research on profit allocation of airline allianceThe profit allocation is an important and contradictory problem in the airline alliance. It plays a determinable role to the continuous and stable development of the cooperation. Firstly the four principles of profit distribution are put forward,then a kind of transferable payment cooperative game model, by using the concept of core and core non-vacant etc. the terms and subject to the payment mechanism of airline alliance's profits are given. On the basis of these, some kinds of methods to fix on the reference value of payment vector are introduced, in which the Nash negotiation model and the Shapely method and Core method and minimum costs-remaining savings(MRCS) are taken emphases on. Because different profit allocation methods get different results, a new profit allocation method is used to resolve this variance. It uses entropy weight method to get the relative weight of each allocation methods, and then it compromises the different results into a relative reasonable profit allocation scheme through weighted average method.5. Reasearch on incentive contract mechanism of airline alliance Designing the incentive contract mechanism of airline accliance is the impormence means of coordination management. The appropriate incentive contract mechanism will enhance the level of coordination. On the basis of the basic analysis frame of principal-agent theory, principal-agent model of airline alliance based on code-sharing is set up. In symmetric information and asymmetric information, the influence on the incentive behavior of airline alliance is analyzed. And under introduced to the inside supervising signal and the outside observation variable, the moral hazard in asymmetric information are solved. This result is provided a reference method for improving the cooperation efficiency of airline alliance.6. Research on risk management of airlin allianceFirstly the basic step of risk analysis and management and the main using method in each phase are stated. Then the conception and characteristic of airline alliance is analyzed. The risk inducement of airline alliance is identified and studied according of different species. The evaluation index system of risk of airline alliance is set up. The evaluation method based on the hierarchy grey evaluation is put forth. The weighted value is constructed by AHP. The grey evaluation weighte coefficient matrix is calculated and the synthesis evaluation result is gained. An example demonstrates the validity of the algorithm. Finally, the aim of risk management of airline alliance is analyzed, and the early-warning system of risk of airline alliance is constructed, and the measure of avoiding and disassembling risk is bringed forward.
Keywords/Search Tags:airline alliance, game theory, cooperation motive, stackelberg model, partner aelection, profit allocation, incentive contract mechanism, risk management, principal-agent theory
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