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Theoretical And Empirical Study Of Chinese Listed Companies Supervisors Incentive Stock Options

Posted on:2006-05-18Degree:MasterType:Thesis
Country:ChinaCandidate:Q F SunFull Text:PDF
GTID:2209360185967465Subject:Quantitative Economics
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Since big shareholders harm small shareholders' benefit is one of the most serious problems which domestic corporate governance faces now, strengthening supervision to monitor big shareholders has become an important task for corporate governance. The supervisory board should take main responsibility in inner supervision of corporate governance, but the supervisory boards in our country have not exert themselves to work hard. There are many reasons and an important one is the scarcity of stimulation to supervisors. In order to search after an effective method to stimulate the supervisors to work hard, this paper verifies the influence of stock option incentives for supervisors to supervisors' job endeavor level, working achievement and company performance by normal analysis, comparative analysis and empirical analysis.Considering securable data, we use three variables to express the situation of stock option incentives for supervisors. The first variable is the ratio of the number of supervisors who are shareholders in the supervisory board. The second one is share number held per supervisor. And the third is the ratio of supervisor's share benefit to annual salary.Normal analysis shows that to a certain degree, stock option incentives for supervisors can stimulate supervisors to work hard. It can improve the supervisor's working achievement and reduce abnormal situations of the company. As to company performance, since it is much more decided by the board of directors and managers' decision-making and performing level, stock option incentives for supervisors can only have indirect influence on it. The influence can't be showed directly by normal analysis, and only recur to data analysis can we clearly see it.Comparative analysis on the correlation coefficients finds that the ratio of the number of supervisors who are shareholders in the supervisory board shows slightly negative correlation with supervisory board's meeting times. Comparative analysis from several different points of view all shows positive influence of stock option incentives for supervisors to their working achievement. Further more, comparative analysis on the situation of stock option incentives for supervisors between...
Keywords/Search Tags:Stock Option Incentives for Supervisors, Company Performance, Comparative Analysis, Empirical Analysis
PDF Full Text Request
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