The Model Of Control And Model Calculations

In order to achieve the common goal, many domains of cooperation can be modeled as coalitional games. However, in many cases, players are unequal in their power to affect the outcome of the game. This article gives the game of power measurement and calculation from two perspectives.First, We use the concept of power index to measure the power of the players. As it is very difficult to calculate the Banzhaf power index, we use the central limit theorem of interval to estimation Banzhaf power index, that is:When kâ†'0,we can formulation the problem as building a confidence interval forβi ,with an accuracy ofεand with confidence level of 1-α.The interval we build is [βi—ε,βi—ε]. Among themε=λ·2^{βi·(1-βi)}/k,λ=U1-Second, The theory in the study of corporate governance, the definition and the measure of control problems, as the domestic shareholders of listed companies to attend the meeting to consider the situation and resolution mechanisms, the application of Banzhaf power index has some limitations. This paper mainly based on discrete input of weighted system reliability theory, combining the weighted voting system of China's listed companies, and given listed companies of control of the weighted voting model, that is:In whichαis the shareholder's degree of control to shareholders,Ï„is the threshold, and it is relevant with Shareholders General Assembly resolution mechanism. Wi(i=1,…,N) ,is the i-st shareholder's ownership percentage, Xi is the i-st shareholder who is or not to attend the meeting.The value of Xi is 1(if the i-st shareholder attends the meeting with probabilityαi)or O(if the i-st shareholder doesn't attend the meeting with probabilityαi), di(â… ) is the results of the vote of all shareholders attending the meeting to consent, not consent or abstention, The distribution of it is Then we use the normal approximation and the universal moment generating function and according to the resolution of the different mechanisms of listed companies to calculate the model.In which when Xi=1, di(â… )=1,The result is the control of the largest shareholder.