Ownership And Control Of Listed Companies On The Familial Conflict

An increasing number of family firms become public companies, thefocues of corporate governance become more and more significant. butmost legal scholars analyse the question with respect of corporate structureand single system, in lack of the thinking of ownership controllingrights.The paper will give the solutions of family firms by ownership andcontrolling rights,with reference of western economic theories.The first chapter mainly identifies family firms,family holdingcorporates, and etc, discusses the history of family businesses, andclarifies the scope of the paper. The second chapter focuses on analysingcurrent status of corporate governance,discusses the characteristic offamily businesses by presenting the economic and managerial empiricaldata. Moreover,the paper give both the empirical and theoretical evidencefrom corporate governance theories. The third chapter give the initialsuggestions on family-controlled corporate ownership and controllingrights conflicts from the point of ownership and controlling rightsadjustment. the analysis is on the basis of the previews results of empiricalanalysis, identification analysis.