Board Of Directors Of Chinese Listed Companies Characteristics Of Earnings Conservatism Empirical Study

Earning conservatism has long been the most important principles of accounting measurement and the most important aspects of accounting theory research. For a long time, researchers have been researching the factors that may affect the earning conservatism. Corporate governance is crucial mechanism of modern enterprise system, and must have impact on earnings conservatism. As the core of corporate governance, the board, is directly in charge of supervision on managers'daily business activities and preparation of financial statements, which can reduce improper income confirms and postpone recording the losses, make the financial reports reliable and the earnings more conservative. Hence, the relationship between the characteristics of board in listed companies and earnings conservatism is worthy of further study, and whether this relationship will vary with the change of equity structure. This paper hopes to solve this hypothesis.Based on reviewing literature, normative analysis and positive analysis are adopted. The thesis researches earnings conservatism in Chinese listed companies, and the relationship between characteristics of the board and earnings conservatism by the use of the listed companies'data from 2005 to 2009. Also, the thesis makes comparisons between different equity constructers. Research finds:1) the Chinese listed companies prove to be entirely conservative, and become less conservative after the 2007 new Accounting Standards put into practise.2) the board's structure characteristics, the more evident share concentration, the more notable board structure characteristics having impacts on the earnings conservatism and the relation is positive. The proportion of independent directors is not significantly correlated with earnings conservatism.3) the board's behavior characteristics, the numbers of times of board meetings have significant negative correlation with earnings conservatism. After making comparisons between states owned enterprises and non-states owned enterprises, we find that the correlation in the non-states owned enterprises is much more significant than in the state owned enterprises. Meanwhile, comparing different equity structures, the numbers of times of board meetings in the low share concentration have more significant correlation with earnings constructivism. At last, the proportion of the directors share significantly negative correlate with earnings conservatism within comparisons between states owned enterprises and non states owned enterprises. In the end, this thesis makes corresponding conclusions according to research results.