"Tunneling" Analysis Of Agricultural Listed Companies From The View Of Ultimate Control Rights

Since the book"modern companies and private property"was written by Berle and Means in the nineteen thirties, Modern company management research had developed vigorously. With the development of company system and the capital market system, the form of corporate control has changed a lot. In the beginning, stock equity was dispersed in small and medium shareholders completely, but the corporate control exclusively focused on executive power; today, capital operation is more diversified, and the control structure of listed company is more complex, which made the generation of the pyramid holding structure. In this holding structure; the ultimate control a lot interest of the listed company by a small amount of ownership, while, large external medium and small shareholders have not acquired the corresponding rights. Then the agency problems appeared. This paper is focus on the agent relationship between ultimate control and medium and small shareholders under the pyramid holding structure.Under the Pyramid equity structure, the listed company's value and the ultimate control person'interest are separated, the ultimate control person the ultimate separation occurs with their own people may control for company management behavior of selfish, with their own interests starting from focus on their own interests, which may violate the interests of listed companies and small and medium shareholders. Such a series of the benefit expropriation behavior is called "Tunneling" vividly in a previous study. Previous literature has researched a lot of the daily public external market's "tunneling" behavior, however, whether the ultimate control person only "tunneling" through open external market? Obviously not, the companies'daily operation process in the efficiency consumption such as luxury on-the-job consumer behavior, daily bribery costs, vacant position cheat behavior also belong to "tunneling". These in a previous study neglected"tunneling"behavior are the concerns in this paper.In China, agricultural has long got the state policy tilt for it is considered the traditionally weak industry. National finance's intervention makes the agriculture influence the policy guidance and financial resource configuration in a large degree .Agricultural listed companies' "tunneling" behavior not only damages the listed company and the interests of small and medium shareholders, but also distort the optimization allocation function of state policy resources, worsen business environment and market speculation. Therefore, this paper focus on the ultimate control, use the agricultural listed companies as the research samples, study the efficiency of companies'"tunneling" behavior.This paper analyses agricultural listed companies'operating performance status and ultimate holding structure through empirical analysis and normative analysis. It uses the internal efficiency of the company as the index to measure the present situation of the listed companies'"tunneling" level, it also uses a regression model to analyze ultimate control person's nature and two rights separation's influence of "tunneling".This paper concludes that (1)the ultimate control affects the internal non-efficiency of?company a lot, two rights separation affects universal human consumption universally, but different nature of the ultimate control "tunneling" in significantly different way; (2)the level of companies "tunneling" is not sensitive to rights separation, the same way to "tunneling" makes its level has no significant difference.