Study On Market Discipline Effect Of Subordinated Debts Issued By Commercial Banks In China

That, the BaselⅡmakes market discipline, the minimum capital requirements and official supervision as the three pillars of strengthening bank supervision, shows the important position of market discipline in the bank supervision. The global financial crisis caused by the US subprime crisis in 2007, deepens the attention of the three pillars of bank supervision. Because of the subprime property of repayment order, no guarantee and a long duration, subordinated debts have unique and strong market discipline effect and have been extensive concern, and have an important role in the effective supervision of commercial banks and the healthy development of financial markets in China. Therefore, that, we study the market discipline effect of subordinated debts issued by commercial banks in China, has important theoretical and practical significances.Firstly, this paper introduces the background and significance, reviews the related research at home and abroad, and puts forward the research thinking, the research contents and innovations. Secondly, this paper theoretically analyzes the market discipline of subordinated debts. We define subordinated debts issued by commercial banks and market discipline, and analyze the reasons, mechanism and influencing factors of market discipline of subordinated debts. Thirdly, this paper builds the theory model of market discipline of subordinated debts. We builds the yield spreads model of subordinated debts to study the influence of bank risk-taking on the yield spreads in the conditions of the explicit deposit insurance system and the implicit state guarantee system respectively, and through the contrast analysis prove that the implicit state guarantee will weaken the market discipline effect of subordinated debts. Fourthly, this paper empirically analyzes the market discipline of subordinated debts. Using the data of Chinese commercial banks, we test the market supervision effect and market impact effect of subordinated debts by constructing the yield spreads model and the issue decision-making model respectively. The results show that the market discipline of subordinated debts issued by Chinese commercial banks is not significant. Lastly, we summarize the main research conclusion of this paper and put forward some policy suggestions.The innovation points of this paper mainly displays in the following two aspects. Firstly, we build the theory model of market discipline of subordinated debts. And we introduce the explicit deposit insurance system and the implicit state guarantee system respectively into the yield spreads model to study the market discipline of subordinated debts, and comparatively analyze the weaken effect of implicit state guarantee on the market discipline effect of subordinated debts. Secondly, we test the market supervision effect and market impact effect of subordinated debts issued by commercial banks in China. We empirically study the market supervision effect of subordinated debts by adopting the yield spreads model, and divide banks into two samples of state-owned banks and no n-state-owned bank to verify the weaken effect of implicit state guarantee. At the same time, we construct the issue dec is ion-making model by using the panel Tobit model to empirically study the market impact effect of subordinated debts.