The Empirical Analysis Of The Influence Of Listed Companies' Operators Stock Option Motivation On The Enterprise Value

As one of the most important incentive mechanisms which aim to improve the governance structure of modern enterprises, the Share Incentive Mechanism first appeared in the United States in the 20 century and then rapidly developed in the 1980s. It plays a great role in promoting the development of New-Economy" of the United States of America. Equity incentives can help improve the relationship between the owner of the company and the corporate operator, attract and retain the talents and stimulate the enthusiasm of the top management and core personnel of the company, Sharing the distribution right of the corporate profits, the spirit of the operator will be inspired and thus the manager's management behavior in the company will become conscious activities, which has far-reaching significance for the long-term development of the enterprise.This article studies the influence of the equity incentive on the governance performance of Chinese listed companies under the background six years after the implement of China's stock right decentralized allot revolution in 2005, thus further analysis the effectiveness of the influence of the equity incentive on governance performance of listed companies in China. Eighty-nine listed companies which publicly disclosed their detailed rules for the implementation of equity incentive in the Shanghai stock exchange and the Shenzhen stock exchange in 2010 are selected as the research objects. With the relevant data of the governance performance and the information about the publicly-disclosed share percent of top management of these eighty-nine listed companies, the correlation of governance performance and share percent of top management is analyzed and the possibility of relevance between shareholding percentage of the top management and governance performance of listed companies is also inspected by the use of Regression Analysis. Structurally, this article is divided into six chapters. Chapter 1 is the introduction; Chapter 2 is the related theory of the equity incentive and of its influence mechanism on governance performance of the company; Chapter 3 is the analysis of the current situation of the implementation effect of the equity incentive system of the listed companies in China; Chapter 4 is the empirical analysis of the relationship between for equity incentive and governance performance of the listed companies in China; Chapter 5 is the advice for perfecting the equity incentive system of the listed companies in China; Chapter 6 is the conclusion and the prospect.Through the analysis of this paper, the conclusion is reached as follows:there exists low correlation between the equity incentive and governance performance of listed companies, with a certain degree of a positive impact. But from my point of view, the reason for this low correlation lies that the governance performance of listed companies is determined by comprehensive factors. Therefore it requires active cooperation from many aspects, such as making scientific evaluation standards of governance performance, strengthening the construction of China's capital market and the manager market, extracting risk guarantee, and improving the internal and external supervision mechanism of listed companies, Only with the cooperation of the establishment and perfection of national laws and regulations will the corporate structure of listed companies be more perfect.