Analysis On The Influence Of Stock Ownership Incentive On The Performance Of Listing Corporation

Listing Corporation mergers and acquisitions is an important way to optimize the allocation of resources,can effectively improve the enterprise's innovation capacity and competitiveness.But the agency problem has been the core problem for enterprise mergers and acquisitions to improve performance.Mergers and acquisitions bring changes in the structure of corporate governance is embodied in the dual principal-agent problem and the shareholders,controlling shareholders and minority shareholders on the management.How to restrain the agency cost has become the common concern of theorists and practitioners.But the effect of stock ownership incentive on agency cost function is paid more and more attention.Equity incentive to reduce the effectiveness of dual agency costs what?Equity incentive can improve the listing Corporation governance structure improvement?Can reduce the agency cost by double to improve the performance of mergers and acquisitions,these issues need to be further verified.SME board,the GEM listed companies is economic entity is an indispensable part of.In recent years,frequent participation in domestic and international capital markets,mergers and acquisitions activity,play a pivotal role,showing the high growth of the enterprise development.And share small plates,the GEM companies incentive larger efforts.The widespread implementation of mergers and acquisitions and equity incentives that improve corporate governance structure can reflect the increase in enterprise performance.In the principal-agent problem from the perspective of and Study on SME board and gem and mergers and acquisitions of listed companies equity incentive has strong representation,in mergers and acquisitions to broaden the related theory research,but also has certain guiding significance on mergers and acquisitions and equity incentive practice.Firstly,theories related to mergers and acquisitions and the agency cost of combing and Analysis on this basis,starting with the influence mechanism of the relationship between agency cost and performance of mergers and acquisitions from equity incentive and agency costs,the establishment of equity incentive,agency cost and performance of mergers and acquisitions of the three intermediary effect model,the equity incentive can improve the performance of mergers and acquisitions hypothesis through the mediating effect of agency cost;and then to 2010-2014 years of SME board and the gem merger of the listing Corporation as a sample,using the balance panel data of three steps of empirical test whether equity incentive and acquisition performance and agency cost impact,and the agency costs between equity incentive and the performance of mergers and acquisitions intermediary utility.The first step is to analyze whether the equity incentive has a significant impact on the performance of the listing Corporation,and then examine the effect of equity incentive on the dual agency costs through the test of the regression coefficient.Finally,the two types of agency costs are added to the first step of the equity incentive and the performance of the multiple regression model,the intermediary effect of the dual agency cost is investigated.The main conclusions of this paper are:the implementation of mergers and acquisitions of small plates,the GEM Listing Corporation are more private capital holding,equity concentration is higher,the manufacturing industry is the multiple industry of its M&a events.Most companies choose horizontal mergers and acquisitions to expand the scale of enterprise development.In the choice of stock option incentive mode,which can guarantee the enterprise operation required capital adequacy,and can achieve the purpose of incentive;mergers and acquisitions of small plates,the GEM Listing Corporation performance generally rose after the first drop,long-term performance improve significantly,show operating synergies;equity incentive can promote the SME board and gem listing Corporation mergers and acquisitions performance improvement that can effectively reduce the agency cost between management and shareholders after the merger,but the treatment effect on the agency problem between controlling shareholders and minority shareholders are not significant;between management and shareholders agency costs to intermediary role on the relation between equity incentive and the performance of mergers and acquisitions,and the agency costs between controlling shareholders and minority shareholders of the intermediary utility is not significant.According to the results of empirical research,and puts forward the policy suggestions:small board and GEM listed companies should be mergers and acquisitions to strengthen supervision of the company before and after the dual principal-agent problem;pay attention to equity concentration adjustment,perfecting the ownership balance degree mechanism;designed to improve the long-term equity incentive mechanism,improve the performance of mergers and acquisitions of enterprises.