State Holding Listed Companies Over-investment Behavior Influencing Factors Empirical Research

In the financial management of the listed companies, the investment is the starting point of the company to do the financial decision, is the activities of the funds allocation. Efficient investment behavior can maximize the value of the company, and thus make to achieve sustainable development of the company in the market competitiveness. In China,by the most listed companies from the former state-owned enterprise restructuring, they can be affected by the former state-owned enterprises uses of financial and banking capital to generate the "thirst for investment",to blind investment frequently,thereby lead to the listed companies exist excessive investment. Currently, the state holding listed companies is the main force of China's economic development. Therefore, the study over-investment behavior in state-controlled of listed companies has important practical significance.In this paper,the author use the three research methods with combining of qualitative, quantitative and comparative, based on the background of China's special system and market environment, starting from the theory basis of over-investment, state-controlled listed companies for the status quo of over-investment, is proposed to many influence factors for increase the cash dividend, increasing managerial ownership, strengthen information disclosure, increased financial analysts to follow up, reduce government intervention, strengthen the environment of the legal system and so on, expect to play a role in mitigate the behavior of over-investment in the state-controlled listed companies.Then, this paper carry on an empirical research of the behavior of over-investment. The author is based on the review of previous results and theories, use the state-controlled listed companies' data in 2007-2009 as the research object, to do the descriptive statistics analysis, correlation analysis, independent sample T test and regression analysis is to analyze whether the existence of over-investment in the state holding listed companies, whether the existence of over-investment in the enterprises directly under the central and the local,whether the existence of over-investment is effect the performance of the company, and whether the influence factors play a role in mitigate the behavior of over-investment. Finally, for the existence of over-investment behavior in the state holding listed companies, this paper proposes many restricting recommendations. This paper have many main results:(1)In China,there is exist to widespread behavior of over-investment in the state-controlled listed companies, and the acts of over-investment in the listed companies with the local controlled is more serious than the enterprises directly under the central; (2) The existence of the behavior of over-investment in the state holding listed companies, resulting in reduce the performance of enterprises; (3) Cash dividends, information disclosure, financial analyst to follow up play a role in the certain constraints for the over-investment behavior in the state holding listed companies, but the constraints are weak; (4) In China, the shares in the Management hands is relatively low in the state-controlled listed companies, leading to the impact of over-investment is very small, Managerial Ownership remained a concern; (5) reducing government intervention and strengthen the environment of the legal system play a role in mitigation for over-investment.