Font Size: a A A

Research On State-owned Enterprise Managers Team Building And Their Incentive And Constraint Mechanism

Posted on:2013-02-04Degree:MasterType:Thesis
Country:ChinaCandidate:G M LiuFull Text:PDF
GTID:2219330374951677Subject:Business Administration
Abstract/Summary:PDF Full Text Request
State-owned enterprises are important part of the national economy, and their performances will have a direct effect on the healthy development of the national economy. The managers have an important role for the enterprises'performance. Therefore, constructing a scientific, efficient incentive and constraint mechanisms is an important thing to improve the efficiency of state-owned capital, prevent the loss of state assets, and preserve and increase the value of state assets. And it is also the key for deepening economic reform and the establishment of modern enterprise system.Since the reform and opening up, Chinese state-owned enterprise reform has been through three stages:the enterprise reform stage with the core content of decentralization and interest concessions, separation of proprietary rights from management rights, the transition from planned economy to market economy, the property rights reform stage focus on the company shareholding system reform, but these reforms are not completely, related links and measures are not in the right place, the overall efficiency of state-owned enterprises is still low, enterprise lack self-development capacity. At present, there are many problems in the incentive and restraint mechanisms of state-owned enterprise managers, such as unreasonable income constitution, low reputation wages, high gray revenue, too much emphasis on the spiritual incentive to ignore the material interests, manager's income is not significantly related to the enterprise'performers, reaping "the system bonuses"; the long-term equity allocation or stock options system is not perfect; the absence of state-owned enterprises caused by principal-agent problem, leads to the corporate governance structure lack of standardization, the vacancy of supervision and restraint mechanisms, etc. These have a great impact on manager's enthusiasm, serious loss of state-owned assets and harming national interests. Moreover, the professional manager market in China started late, the level of the market development is relatively slow, now it is facing with low market demand, lack of sufficient market participants, low professional level, low quality professional managers, lack of supporting systems such as the manager market selection mechanism, evaluation system, credit system, legal environment, etc.Based on this, this thesis proposed to build a state-owned enterprise manager team system, with market risk premium, multi-level incentives, and fairness as the principle. From the visual angle of manager's market entry, selection, training and exit to cultivate and improve the comprehensive competitiveness of the managers team, through the establishment of market-competitive pay incentives, the growth channel, the incentive of the safeguard mechanism and restraint mechanism. This paper tried to promote the manager team system by building series efficient mechanisms, and longed for the eventual establishment of long-term development. I hope this study can provide a new idea for the reform of state-owned enterprises.
Keywords/Search Tags:state-owned enterprises manager, incentive and restraint mechanism, "double channel" effect
PDF Full Text Request
Related items