A Research On The Coordination In The Third Party Tack-back Reverse Supply Chain

With the continuous progress of science and technology, and the rapid development of global productivity, as well as the customers'individual consumption and the product shorten life cycle. It brings increasingly serious of resources waste and environmental pollution. In recent years, with the reinforcement in the awareness of environmental protection and the proposed of sustainable development strategy, people are increasingly aware of the importance and urgency about recycling of resources. Reverse supply chain as an effective way to achieve recycling of resources to get people extensive attention. Reverse supply chain has a profound influence and significance for enhancing the corporate image, meeting the environmental regulatory requirements, and participating in international competition. With the development of the reverse supply chain, the third-party reverse logistics began to appear. How to coordinate the profits between the third-party logistics recycling enterprise and manufacturers is becoming the focus.This thesis focuses on the coordination between the manufacturers and the third party logistics recycling enterprise in the third party take-back reverse supply chain(TPT-RSC). Build the coordination model in the third party take-back reverse supply chain. After analysis of the links, features and advantages of the third-party take-back reverse supply chain, it summarizes the reasons of imbalance in the third-party take-back reverse supply chain. Then it builds the TPT-RSC coordination model under symmetric information, analyzes the results between decentralized decision-making and centralized decision-making, and uses the price subsidies contract to achieve the TPT-RSC coordination. Under asymmetric information, it constructs the TPT-RSC coordination model by principal-agent theory. After meeting the conditions of participation constraint and incentive compatibility constraint, it achieves the best strategy and makes sure the TPT-RSC coordination. Finally, it does the simulation analysis of TPT-RSC coordination mechanism under symmetric information, proposes the TPT-RSC development strategy in China's electronic waste recycling. The main innovations are as follows:(1) Under the symmetric information, it uses game theory to build Stackelberg game model of decentralized decision-making and centralized decision-making in the TPT-RSC. Based on centralize decision-making model and by introduction of a price subsidy contract, it improves the profits between the manufacturers and the third party logistics recycling enterprise, achieves the coordination of the reverse supply chain system.(2) Under the asymmetric information, it constructs the TPT-RSC coordination model by principal-agent theory. The model fully considers the market random factors, the effort cost coefficient and the risk aversion degree and the other factors, which affect the manufacturer to choose the incentive coefficient, the third-party effort degree, as well as manufacturers and third party revenue. After meeting the participation constraints and incentive compatibility constraint conditions to achieve the optimum of the whole benefits of the reverse supply chain.