The Moral Hazard Of Social Medical Insurance And The Related Precautions

In recent years, the expenses in medical service system have been growing rapidly, whether indeveloping or developed countries. In fact, it's becoming a global problem. Generally, the growingmedical service expenses can be caused by institutional and non-institutional reasons. The formerreason means moral hazard in medical service system, both from patients and doctors. And thenon-institutional reason includes the growth of the per capita income, great change in demographicstructure and spectrum of disease, and development of the medical science and technology. In China,the dominant reason of medical spending growth is moral hazard, which squandered the limitedmedical resources.In the first chapter of this paper, by reviewing the related paper home and abroad, we proposedthe problem and the method to solve it. The method includes documents analysis, normativeanalysis and empirical analysis.Based on the analysis on some typical medical tangle cases, the second chapter shows the detail andthe form of expression of the moral hazard. The medical service supplier is inclined to inducedemand and cheat medical insurance fund, etc. And the medical service demander is always likelyto overuse medical resources. When they work together, the conspiracy could make great moralhazard.In the third chapter, we analyzed the particularity of the medical service system, pointed outthat the main flews exist in institutional level, which can greatly cause the moral hazard.The last chapter proposed suggestions and measures to guard against the moral hazard inmedical insurance system. The basic way is that we need set up a system to recognize and value theprices of medical services, and improve the transparency of medical information. Methods toprevent moral hazard from the demanders and suppliers are also given. And the government, as theregulator in the medical service system, is needed to be supervised by the medium to prevent"government failure".