Kripke On The Normativity Of Meaning

In Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language, Saul Kripke presents a skeptical argument for the paradoxical conclusion that there are no facts about what we mean by our words. Kripke also outlines what he calls a "skeptical solution" to the paradox. In the argument, a central role is played by the contention that meaning is normative. The so-called normativity of meaning puts a substantial constraint on any acceptable theories of meaning—to the extent, some would say, of altogether precluding purely naturalistic or descriptive accounts of meaning. This aspect of meaning plays a crucial role in the criticism of dispositionalism. A great deal of the debate over Kripke’s text has concerned the role of normativity considerations in the skeptical argument. However, there is little consensus among commentators on either the correct interpretation or the truth of these considerations. I shall point out that a certain influential interpretation of semantic normativity does not successfully produce a serious constraint on naturalistic semantic theory. Moreover, semantic anti-normativists have produced a number of arguments to show that meaning is not an essentially normative notion. In the skeptical solution, Kripke gives an account of normativity in virtue of communal agreements. However, according to Davidson, we have no reason to suppose that shared ways of speaking are essential to meaning something. He denies that we can only legitimately say that someone means something by a word if we see that he does as we do.