A Study Of Normativity Based On Rule-Following

"Normativity" is always a conception involved in the core of philosophy. Any kind of philosophical paradigm inherently requires the establishment of its normative basis. Kant’s "normative turn" created the a priori approach to normativity in one hand, and revealed the priority of the semantic normativity to epistemic normativity, thus preparing the conditions for the ’semantic turn’ of normativity. This dissertation tries to reveal the evolution of the ways of discussion and contents of "normativity" in the history of philosophy, and figures out that Wittgenstein’s rule-following problem and the discussions initiated have special significance for the semantic turn of normativity. The development and subject of normativity can be interpreted by the analyses of meaning ascriptions, the relation between dispositionality and condisionals, non-factualism, semantic realism, etc. Through the analysis that combines the normativity of meaning and the normativity of content, this dissertation indicates that the study of normativity has undergone a gradual process from language to mind, from meaning to content and from the rules (in the sense of strong and explicit normativity) to the correctness conditions (in the sense of weak and implicit normativity). This transition process means that the semantic and syntactical normativity will definitely step into pragmatic normativity, and all three constitute a normative context.This dissertation includes an introduction, five chapters of systematically discussions of the main topics, and the end is the concluding remark.In the beginning, this dissertation briefly introduces the importance and performances of the topic of normativity in philosophy, shows how normativity becomes one of the advanced topics in contemporary semantics and the related research fields, explains the reasons for the study of normativity based on rule-following and figures out the aim and significance of the topic. After analyzing the present development at home and abroad according to the main fields of normativity, it teases out the problems that needs to be solved, and then clarifies the research ideas, main contents and innovations.Chapter One teases out the connotation of normativity in general and makes a historical review of the problem of normativity. And on this basis, Kant’s normative turn and its significance are elaborated. Moreover, this chapter also reveals how Kant’s normative turn has prepared for the contemporary semantic turn of normativity and the semantic turn is to a large extent attributed to Kripke’s interpretation of Wittgenstein’s rule-following and the controversies initiated. Considering the development of analytic philosophy in the 20th century, this semantic turn evolved into several different research approaches, such as reductionism, quietist realism and pragmatism, etc. After analyzing and comparing these approaches, this chapter focuses on the examination of the rule-following paradox and its skeptical solution, especially on the analysis of the normative factors of Kripke’s skeptical argument. And then it compares the dispositional facts and normative facts and reveals the troubles of dispositional interpretations and the epistemic dilemma in the process of following a rule. To exemplify the possibility of following a rule, this chapter further analyzes the constitutive conditions of a rule, and points out those traditional explanatory approaches and their own limitations.Chapter Two points out that the related discussions of normativity provide a starting point of the exploration of language and meaning ascriptions. To question the reason and foundation of the actions of following a rule, thereby provide a plausible justification of meaning ascriptions, we must interpret their normative dimensions. Firstly, this chapter starts from the justification argument which related to meaning ascriptions, analyzes the gap between the facts that descript dispositional actions and the facts of normative conclusions, and explains the differences between normativity and disposionality by considering McGinn’s "capability" solution. On the other hand, the concept of normativity, which is crucial to the understanding of meaning ascriptions, is a problem needed to be clarified. That’s why there is a respective investigation on simple dispositionality analysis and ideal conditional dispositionality analysis. Moreover, the introduction of conditional analysis can provide a unique perspective and detailed analytical way for the reading and reconstruction of the concept of dispositionality. Secondly, the non-factualism of meaning ascriptions plays a very important role in Kripke’skeptical argument. Through the semantic analysis of the relationship between non-factualism and truth conditions, and the analysis of the "truth" in non-factulism, this chapter tries to reveal the defects of the arguments for some representative theories, and points out the dilemma that the global meaning non-factualism faces and its underlying reason. Finally, since the connotation of normativity has been so controversial in the explanations of meaning ascriptions, we need to elaborate the semantic connotations of normativity, prescription, norm-relativity and intrinsic normativity on the basis of the analysis of those related controversies, interpret the normative requirements in different senses, and clarify the connotation of normativity by the comparison with some related conceptions, e.g. correctness and effectiveness, etc.The semantic turn of normativity has indicated the fundamental significance of semantic analysis in this issue, and this situation calls for the elaboration of the multiple implications of normativity on the semantic level. Taking the normativity of meaning as the core, the interpretations in Chapter Three include the following aspects:The first step is to illuminate the normative implications of linguistic meaning and the correctness conditions of the expressions, clarify different forms of rules and the corresponding normative requirements, and then indicate that the correctness of the use of linguistic expressions does not mean the commitment to strong normativity by combining with the "ought implies can" formula. Secondly, it has been generally assumed that semantic realism plays a crucial role in the skeptical argument, however, the analysis of the relationship between normativity and realism shows that the presumption of semantic realism does not necessarily entail meaning skepticism. On this basis, this chapter explores the connotations of semantic realism and semantic normativity, and then re-examine the related claims in the context of contemporary debates between semantic realism and anti-realism. This kind of exploration tries to seek a justification of semantic realism, meanwhile, it also presents the multi-implications of semantic normativity. Finally, this chapter compares Kripke’s argument with Quine’s thesis of indeterminacy and argues that both of them interpret the same dimension of meaning understanding by different routes, that’s why they won’t refute the normativity of meaning.Chapter Four figures out the semantic analysis of normativity will inevitably extend to the mental states and contextual factors of speaker’s linguistic practice. The semantic "oughts" will involve the proposition attitudes, e.g. belief, desire and etc. That’s why the analysis of normativity of meaning should combine the normativity of content and thus develop an analysis on the pragmatic level. This chapter starts from the picture of rule-following practices, reveals the practical effectiveness of rules and claims that we should understand the practical "oughts" from the view of weak and implicit normativity. And that will require us to combine the meaning ascriptions and belief ascriptions, examine the normativity and reasonability of belief, and then consider the normativity of content in a broader horizon of practical reason to explore the connection between the reasonable’ought’and agent’s motivation. This chapter also analyzes and compares different approaches in the debates between internalism and externalism so as to maintain a moderate tension of them. Finally, on the basis of the distinctions between normative assertions and non-normative assertions, this chapter argues that there is a theoretical tendency from "strong explanation" of motivational internalism to "weak explanation" of it, and the way "reason" functions can be taken as a process from "implicit" to "explicit".Considering its theoretical features and implications, the normativity issue can be interpreted through a triple structure of syntax, semantics and pragmatics. Chapter Five argues for the possibility and significance of the normative context and points out that the constitution and implications of this normative context will provide a reasonable space to explain how an agent acts on the basis of "reason". Meanwhile, the discussions of the following aspects, e.g. the contextual dependence and contextual sensitivity of "reason", the difference and connection between "normative reason" and "motive reason", also represent the practical dimension of the normative context. The agent is guided by the normative power in the practical process and can also have access to the "Knowing-How" by practical reasoning on the pragmatic level, and so that the external normative reasons and requiements can be made more explicit. Consequently, the multi-implications and practical dimension of normative context can provide a reasonable space for us to explore the problem of meaning, and then we can reconsider the traditional explanations of meaning and open up a new way of contextualist meaning normativity.