Theory Of Company Deadlock Judicial Cracking

Although China’s Company Law sets the regulation that shareholders can conductjudicial dissolution of the company through legal action, there are still imperfections inthis regulation so that the practical operation of it is very difficult. The regulation can’treflect the effectiveness and timeliness of judicial relief of China’s Company Law.Moreover, it is blind and limiting to take judicial decision as the last resort of solvingthe company’s deadlock. Therefore, when solving the company’s deadlock, we mustabide by the principles of self-help priority, interest measurement and cautious decisionof dissolution, take full account of the organic unity of social influence and legal effect,and actively explore the alternative solutions to improve the legal system of breakingthe company’s deadlock.Through specific elaboration of the company’s deadlock and the rationality ofjudicial intervention into it, this thesis explores the alternative judicial solutions to thecompany’s deadlock. By analyzing the concrete regulations of China’s Company Lawand in combination with foreign legislation cases, this thesis also probes into theimproving measures that are conductive to the protection of shareholders’ interests, theguarantee of company’s normal operation as well as the stable development of marketeconomy.