The Study Of Company Executives Incentive System

In the modern corporate system, the company ownership and control right separation, resulting in a principal-agent problem. As the agent of the company executives, their own interests and the interests of shareholders conflicted. It is necessary to establish a set that making company executives and shareholders’ interest convergence as far as possible, strengthening company executives performance and incentive systems associated with the incentive and restraint system, to solution the problem of corruption and the problem that company executives abuse power brings huge company loss, because of motivate excessive and constraint less.In this paper, it uses a comparative analysis of method to the company executives incentive system in which the specification and its practical Into the United States, Britain and other developed countries,so this paper straighten out the company’s executive incentive’s incentive and restraint system. And reference to economics, management and other related areas of empirical research data, this paper use comprehensive analysis to analysis our executives’ incentive system and suggestions for Improvement. This paper will be divided into four parts.The first chapter is overview of the company executives ’incentive system. On the basis of clear senior management meaning and scope, this part focuses on the company executives’ incentive system concept as well as stock options, management buyouts, four main incentives. And it explains the corporate governance theory, the principal-agent theory, human capital theory. Then we can understand the company executives’ incentive system theoretical origin.The second chapter is the company executives’ incentive and restraint system, including that the incentive and restraint systems of company executive incentive, including salary and remuneration committee of dynamic evaluation, stock options and stock markets supervision, management buyouts and acquisitions, non-material incentives and the relevant systems establishment. We use this four aspects to Solve the company executives incentive system of incentive unconstrained, motivation and restraint not symmetrical difficult problem to the encouragement and restriction of the unity of oppositesThe third chapter is the present situation and problems of our company executives’ incentive system. This chapter summarizes the problems of the remuneration committee independence loss, the incomplete system of independent directors, executive pay information disclosure not transparent and other six parts. So we hope in view of China’s company executives incentive system flaw suit the remedy to the case.The fourth chapter is the countermeasures improving the incentive system of company executives. This chapter attempts to perfect the problems of strengthening the remuneration committee independence, improving information disclosure system, perfecting the system of independent directors and so on. This part’s core is focus on company executives incentive system of restriction system.Overall, this article straighten out the incentive and constraint system of executive incentive system, multifaceted analysis the problems of china in excitation system of company executives, providing a few suggestions for improving the incentive system of company executives, with a view of contribute modest contributions to the theoretical of corporate governance in China.