Analysis On Natural Gas Supply Monopoly Case Of Yueyang City

Administrative monopoly is the unlawful administrative deed of the governmentand its departments. In the pursuit of the narrow interests, they take coercive measuresto exclude and restrict the competition. In the past, considering to the regulation ofAdministrative monopoly, the concern was focused on the restrictions on executivepower, ignoring the judicial power, which playing an active role in oversight of theexecutive power. Judicial practice, inspires us, relying solely on the administrativesystem of internal self-monitoring, is not enough for effective regulation ofAdministrative monopoly. The nature of the Administrative monopoly is that theexecutive power, illegally interventing in the market and undermining the faircompetition order. Therefore, there is a need to establish a much more authoritativesystem to cure Administrative monopoly, no doubt, relying on the supervision andreview of the judicial power on the executive power should become an irreplaceablepart of this system. Firstly, there is a analysis on the specific case in this paper, thenaccording to the prombles which shown in the case, from building a Reconsiderationavoidance system, the abstrast Administrative monopoly behavior appeal system anddefinding Administrative monopoly behavior in the judicial review system threeaspects of the focus on the analysis and demonstration, especially, there is a talk on thelegislative status quo, significance and improvement of the judicial review settlementmechanism.The Reconsideration withdrawal system is a reference to the judicial process, in thereview process to establish a new mechanism of the specification of power, relying onadministrative procedures designed to compensate for the limitations of theadministrative system, so that the Administrative reconsideration can regulate theAdministrative monopoly behavior more effectively.Abstract Administrative monopoly behavior into the court is an important meansof judicial power, effective checks and balances on executive power. The abstractAdministrative monopoly behavior, of course, can rely on specific Administrativemonopoly shown, the court may review the specific Administrative monopoly behavior.At a time when abstract Administrative monopoly behavior is not revoked, remains inthe form of its effectiveness, but in reality has been seriously questioned. Thisapproach faces a paradox: First of all, if you do not review the abstract Administrativemonopoly behavior, you can not determine the legality of specific Administrative monopoly behavior. Secondly, if the effectiveness of the specific Administrativemonopoly behavior is denied, rather than the effectiveness of the abstractAdministrative monopoly behavior, which as a basis of the specific Administrativemonopoly behavior. Not only undermine the judicial authority, but not also finallyrecorrect the Administrative monopoly behavior.On the Construction of the definding Administrative monopoly behavior in thejudicial review system. At present, China’s administrative rules and regulations ofAdministrative monopoly model has some limitations.“The anti-monopolyadministrative enforcement system identified in the existing anti-Administrativemonopoly, does not meet the internal sanctions of administrative monopoly need[1].”Therefore, to overcome the defects of the administrative regulation of Administrativemonopoly model and achieve the purpose of the anti-Administrative monopoly, there isa need to seek a other new power, judicial power, as a other force can become an activepart in the regulation of Administrative monopoly system. In order to achieve this aim,we can make efforts on rationally planning of Anti-Administrative monopoly lawagencies within the court, definding a clear procedure to start the main body, theestablishment of competition agencies within the courts and improving the legalresponsibility.