The Design Of Regulation In Monopoly Industry And Collusion-Proof Contrast

In the scientific management system of free market economy and government intervention, the two opposing economic thoughts of laisser-faire and state inter-vention are developed. In this context, economics of regulation is generated and developed. With the development in regulation practice, design of regulation. collusion and collusion-proof contrast have been the mainstream of research. Tn the situation of slow economic recovery, the question of regulation in developing countries has become increasingly important. This thesis studies the following two questions.Firstly, this thesis studies a regulation problem of natural monopoly industry under asymmetric information, in which the state-owned assets supervision and administration commission of the state council is a principal and the natural monopoly industry is an agent. Due to lacking the historical date and experience the principal can only make a subjective assessment about the agent’s type. So, it’s reasonable to denote the subjective assessment of the agent’s type as a fuzzy variable and establish a fuzzy regulation model to maximize the social welfare function of the principal. Pontryagin maximum principle is adopted to obtain the necessary condition of the optimal solution. At last, we give a numerical example to verify the feasibility of the necessary condition of the optimal solution and analyze the economic significance of the optimal solution.Secondly, this thesis considers a novel class of collusive problems, where a regulator makes a regulation affected by his private preference between a con-sumer and a monopoly. Unlike previous research, the collusion was discussed from the angles of signal transmission and screening. The regulation model is es-tablished in four cases and the optimal regulations arc obtained respectively. By comparing the optimal regulations, two main results can be drawn. One gives the reason that the regulator can be bribed by the monopoly; and the another reveals that if only the regulator colludes with the monopoly, the regulator must be fully bribed by the monopoly in the end. On this basis, to prevent the collusion, the ex ante and ex post collusion-proof contrasts are established respectively. These contracts indicate that the consumer should undertake an additional cost in the ex ante collusion-proof contrast, while, in the ex post collusion-proof contrast, the government should adopt a severe penalization to prevent the collusion.