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Research On The Influence Of Managers’ Reputation On Stakeholders’ Benefits

Posted on:2013-07-29Degree:MasterType:Thesis
Country:ChinaCandidate:B FuFull Text:PDF
GTID:2249330362965068Subject:Accounting
Abstract/Summary:PDF Full Text Request
Economists have been put into a hidden incentive reputation incentive, and are thedominant excitation mechanism of the alternatives. Entrepreneurs through the accumulationof their own reputation capital to improve their human resource value, to obtain the manageron the market more room for bargaining, making his professional career managers can longcontinue. Conversely, if the entrepreneurs use adverse selection strategy, the result can onlyruin his career. In this paper, modern theory of modern human capital theory and managementtheory, based on the full attention of entrepreneurs, entrepreneurial pursuit of that reputationis to better improve their status and managers in the market value.In the separation of ownership of enterprises, managers gain the basic problem is thatallocation decisions will be allocated to income in the split between employees and investors.Division managers to make decisions that impact factor is the reputation mechanism and toplease investors. In this paper, the problem is that the reputation mechanism is only foremployees benefit? Please mechanism can really bring benefits to investors and managersdo?Based on the above questions this paper two hypotheses, assuming one: reputationmanagement mechanism for shareholders, employees, managers will benefit themselves andtheir overall positive impact. And Hypothesis2: Managers please mechanism forshareholders, employees, managers and their overall self-interest will be adversely affectedothers.In the context of multi-period game, this paper uses experimental methods to collect datafor statistical analysis found that managers not to unilaterally establish the reputationmechanism and to please investors can bring cooperative game, and thus the overall interests,the interests of investors, employees and management interests benefit the interests of both;but only to please investors, regardless of and employee benefits, which could onlynon-cooperative game, the relevant interests of the parties is not good, even to please theobject (investors) do no good.
Keywords/Search Tags:implicit reputation, dynamic game, stakeholder, please mechanism
PDF Full Text Request
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