The Effect Of Investor Protection Mechanism On The Quality Of Accounting Information Disclosure

Information and incentives has been troubled by two major problems of modern capitalmarkets. Urgent need for rapid and sound development of capital markets in emerging marketcountries, how to lead by minimizing transaction costs is a key issue. Studies have shown thatenhanced information disclosure of listed companies is a possible solution. Healy and Palepu(2001) believe that good information disclosure can not only reduce the informationasymmetry between capital supply and demand, improve resource allocation efficiency in themarket, but also for external investors, company management, monitoring and evaluationprovide the basis to reduce moral hazard and opportunistic behavior, thus promoting theeffective functioning of capital markets played a significant role. However, due to distortionof information disclosure, listed companies as a result of not timely insider trading case ofdamage to the interests of small shareholders often happens, a serious impediment to listedcompanies and capital market development. Although the introduction of the relevantdepartments to spare no effort to inform and law, these measures aim to improve from theconduct of listed companies on the quality of information disclosure. But once again after theoutbreak of Highne, Hangxiao events such that the problem is not rooted in the informationdisclosure system or the accounting department itself, but rather the confusion of corporategovernance.Based on China’s Shanghai and Shenzhen08-10years, the company’s3033panel samplecross-section data and the3941sample companies empirical data from the robustness,timeliness, earnings radical to characterize the degree of the three aspects of quality ofaccounting information disclosure, and from legal environment, describe the effect of investorprotection and corporate level, the mechanism of explanatory variables, the sample data basedon the macro-environment for group discussion of legal issues two types of investors underthe protection agent on the quality of accounting information disclosure of listed companiesthe impact of the multiple regression analysis. Empirical results support the content of thisarticle assumes that you can believe that China’s macro-level of investor legal system, themore beneficial for the company’s robust accounting information, accounting information oflisted companies to enhance the quality of disclosure. From the corporate level, saidprotection of investors under the two types of agency cost accounting information disclosuremechanism for robustness, timeliness, earnings have a significant impact on the radical degree. Regional legal environment favorable to investors, large shareholders and small shareholdershave agency problems between investors protection robustness of accounting informationdisclosure, timeliness and earnings have a significant impact on the radical degree; in weakgroups between large shareholders and minority shareholders of the agency problem resultinginvestor protection mechanisms only affect the timeliness of accounting informationdisclosure, the degree of robustness and radical did not affect earnings. Regional legalenvironment favorable to investors, shareholders and managers of the agency problembetween investor protection arising from the disclosure of accounting information systemrobustness, timeliness, and degree of surplus radical has a significant influence, but its impactis less than between large shareholders and small shareholders agency problems of investorprotection under the mechanism; weak group of shareholders and managers in the agencyproblems arising between the investor protection disclosure of accounting information andearnings stability of the radical has a weak degree of significance, but has nothing to do withthe timeliness. And through robust testing (expanded investor protection indicators, indicatorsof timeliness), the paper conclusion is still valid, reliable and effective research.