| With the outbreak of the worldwide subprime mortgage crisis in2007, the vagueinformation disclosure in the the finance industry is an important incentive to weaken marketdiscipline. And the sub-prime crisis caused large-scale collapse of the banks also makes us clearthat the lack of supervision and moral hazard is an important factor of leading to banking crises.Therefore, introducing an appropriate degree of information disclosure system among the lawregulations and providing a proper investment environment could encourage more marketinvestors to conduct effective market constraints on the risk of the banks. It is able to adjust thebank’s risk exposure to reduce the bank’s moral hazard, and ultimately conducive to maintainingthe stability of commercial banks.Using of14commercial banks’ data from2003to2010,we make an empirical study of therelationship between information disclosure and the stability of bank. The stability of china’scommercial banks gradually increased. The disclosure of information improves the commercialbanking system of governance, and promotes the stability of the bank. However, in order toenhance the role of market constraints of disclosure of information, we need to improve theinstitutional environment and market infrastructure in corresponding. The growth of the size ofbank’s asset and profit promotes the stability of commercial banks. China’s state-owned banksreceive the guarantee of the national credit, and joint-stock banks have a relatively perfectsystem of governance, so the stability of the two does not exist significant differences. |