Empirical Study On The Characteristics Of Board And Quality Of Accounting Information Disclosure Of Our Country’s Listed Companies

In the capital market environment, the disclosed accounting information of listed company is important to investors to make investment decisions. Based on the concern for their own interests, investors have the demand for high-quality accounting information. Therefore, the level of the quality of accounting information disclosure of listed companies become a prominent problem, but also become the focus of academic study. However in recent years, accounting information disclosure of listed companies in China is difficult to improve the quality. How can improve the quality of accounting information disclosure? For this issue, the relevant government departments are continuing to take measures to solve, but to improve the quality of accounting information must start from the root. The root is our current governance structure of listed companies, it is the internal governance. Inadequate corporate governance structure restricts the disclosure of accounting information quality, to solve the problem lies in the effectiveness of internal control. The board of directors as the company a major force in the internal governance mechanisms, is the highest internal control mechanism, and its disclosure of accounting information quality will have a significant impact. The board of directors represents the company’s principal shareholders. It has the responsibility to supervising manager to prepare the financial reporting. Therefore, a sound board is the cornerstone to improve the quality of accounting information disclosure.Since 1993, the system of board of directors has a series of reforms in these years. Whether the board of listed companies is fully and effectively, thus improving the quality of accounting information disclosure? Domestic and foreign scholars have done a lot of research. The findings show that the board characteristics have an effect on the quality of accounting information, but the specific direction of influence there is no uniform view. Therefore, many scholars and securities regulators are particularly concerned about the board of directors of listed companies under the auspices of the quality of accounting information disclosure. This issue has become the focus of attention. This article is based on this phenomenon in an attempt to fully summarize results of previous scholars, based on the reference specification and empirical research method, the key factor in corporate governance-the board characteristics and combination of accounting information quality empirical research.This paper is divided into a total of six parts:Chapter 1 is the introduction. This section first introduces the background of this paper. The following is research ideas and research methods. The end is a brief description of the framework.Chapter 2 is the literature review. This article looked for home and abroad on board characteristics and the quality of accounting information related literature, a full review of previous research results, according to the direction and purpose of this study make Summary.Chapter 3 is the board characteristics and the quality of accounting information theory. First, It defines the Board of Directors concepts, including: directors, board of directors, board characteristics, quality of accounting information and accounting information quality and measure the quality of accounting information.disclosure. Then It analyze the agency theory, asymmetric information and signaling theory and stakeholder theory which are the theoretical basis of the contents of this paper.Chapter 4 is the research hypothesis and research design. This paper selects the Shenzhen Stock Exchange listed company as research sample, annual intervals from 2007 to 2009, the Shenzhen Stock Exchange "board credit file" in the "information disclosure evaluation" of the evaluation results as the quality of accounting information disclosure alternative variables, selected from the Board of Directors representative of the characteristics of the variables, including board size, proportion of independent directors, board of directors and the ownership of board meetings as explanatory variables in four areas. Made the following assumptions: Board Size and Quality of Accounting Information does not exist between a significant correlation; proportion of independent directors and disclosure of accounting information quality was a significant positive correlation; annual board meetings and the disclosure of accounting information quality was a significant positive correlation; ownership of board and the quality of accounting information disclosure was a significant positive correlation. According to the hypothesis put forward multiple regression model building.Chapter 5 is the empirical results and analysis. The following conclusions:(1) In terms of board size, board size and the quality of accounting information disclosure was a significant positive correlation. (2) The proportion of independent directors on the quality of accounting information disclosure was no significant relationship. (3) Board meetings and the quality of accounting information disclosure was a significant negative correlation. (4) The board of directors the higher the shareholding ratio, the higher the quality of accounting information disclosure.Chapter 6 is the conclusions. Contribution of this paper is:(1) the selection of variables, the paper’s independence from the board of directors characteristics, behavioral characteristics, incentive, select the most representative characteristics of several alternative indicators as explanatory variables, particularly ownership of board. It is very important in the board stimulating alternative indicator. In the past on the board of directors characteristics and the relationship between accounting information of quality is rarely involved. (2) In this paper, the Shenzhen Stock Exchange A share listed companies as samples for evaluation of the results of Shenzhen as a substitute for accounting information quality variables, objectivity is better. Lack of research include:(1) sample selection. This paper is selected in Shenzhen in 2007 and 2009 A-share listed company data, and do not select all the listed companies in China, the sample coverage is not wide. And the Shanghai and Shenzhen in China listed companies with regional differences, the board of directors.characteristics and to measure the quality of accounting information are different, which may affect the rigor of the conclusions of the article. (2) The empirical analysis will be selected the 1796 samples, do not take into account industry factors, sub-sectors of the systematic classification of statistical analysis should be the direction of future research. (3) The quality of accounting information can also affect the company’s board of directors. Because of accounting information as a signal to convey to investors the company operations and operating results, once investors find the accounting information which is bound to lose confidence in the board and managers, it may lead to the Board of Directors to govern, which requires research in the future in depth.