The Positive Reaserch On The Relationship Between Agency Costs And Earnings Management Of Our Country’s Listed Companies

Agency costs arise from the misalignment of the interests of the agents and principals of firms when the separation of ownership and control occurs, Agents passed to the principals of non-real accounting information through the earnings management behavior. So it is necessary to study the agency costs and earnings management to provide reasonable policy recommendations for the protection of the interests of the principals.This paper reviewed the causes of the agency-principal conflicts, the factors affected agency costs and the related issues of earnings management. From three different types of agency relationship, agency costs are dividend into equity agency costs, debt agency costs and agency costs of control. According the conditions of listed companies and capital market in our country, we select more reasonable financial indicators as the measurement of agency costs to reflect the loss of operational efficiency or the additional expenditure. And then establish a multi-regression model to empirically analysis the relationship between agency costs and earnings management.The results show that the governance structure of listed companies in our country cannot play a effective role, the hypothesis that higher agent-principal conflict listed companies will improve the corporate governance structure to suppress earnings management many empirical analysis based on is not reasonable. In China’s listed companies, high agency costs companies are more likely to cosmetic the accounting report with earnings management, dividends is an effective way to protect the interests of minority shareholders. Also the state-owned listed companies as the main part in our country have serious agency costs problem and earning management behavior, the existing regulatory system need improvement and adjustment.