Font Size: a A A

Agency Conflict, Governance Efficiency And Institutional Constraints

Posted on:2015-06-26Degree:MasterType:Thesis
Country:ChinaCandidate:W R ZhouFull Text:PDF
Abstract/Summary:PDF Full Text Request
As a microscopic unit,Chinese listed companies plays an important role inpromoting China’s economic development and social stability. Governance efficiencyof listed companies directly related to the health of economic development and theoptimal allocation of resources. Base on the perspective of corporate governance, thearticles analyze the efficiency losses. In detail, we start this research though twodimensions both the benefits and costs. Using heterogeneity of the stochastic frontieranalysis method and DuPont financial analysis system, the thesis try to extract thevalue of the frontier relying on the core competence of the company, so as the cost ofthe agency conflicts. Then use a variety of institutional constraints as endogenousvariable costs of anti-launched agency costs, in order to find a variety of institutionalconstraints to ease the effects of conflict agent and its stability, and finally bydesigning corporate governance efficiency index, objective evaluation of China’slisted companies directly govern the situation.The study found, thanks to the system of corporate governance standards andspecifications such as split share structure reform, China’s listed companies since2002to2012, and the company achieved significantly improved governanceefficiency, but the overall efficiency of only75.9%, which is not optimistic. Inaddition, the contrast of various governance mechanisms, compensation incentives,equity governance, property rights mechanism effectively easing the two types ofagency conflicts, pay incentives of equity incentive is clearly insufficient; externalgovernance mechanisms debt governance mechanism, the market competitionmechanism has become an effective alternative mechanism of internal governancemechanisms, however, although the mechanism of independent directors formallywith international convergence can be no significant treatment effect.
Keywords/Search Tags:Corporate governance efficiency, Agency conflicts, Agency costs, Governance mechanisms, Core competencies, Stochastic frontier model
PDF Full Text Request
Related items