Research On The Relationship Between The Shareholding Of Top Management With Business Performance And The Quality Of Accounting Information Of Listed Companies

Since the emergence of ownership and management separation, the principal-agent problem becomes issues of concern of modern enterprises.The research object of this problem is the listed companies of shenzhen and shanghai stock exchange in 2008. Through an empirical analysis of the listed companies, the relationship between shareholding of top management and business performance is not always directly proportional, which may be poured into the u-shaped relation. Therefore, listed companies should attach importance to the long-term incentives in senior management incentive mechanism,when shareholding of top management is lower ,increase the percentage and when top management shareholding is too high ,decrease it. Only in this way can make it really play a role.In principal-agent relationships, due to the principal and agent are "rational economic man", so "moral hazard" and adverse selection are inevitable because of information asymmetry. Therefore the accounting information quality of the listed companies has been of importance both in theory and practice. The research object of this problem is the listed companies of shenzhen and shanghai stock exchange in 2008. This problem is solved by establishing a mathematical model .After the empirical study the relationship between shareholding of top management and the accounting information quality is poured into u-shaped relation. Therefore, when the senior management personnel shareholding is low, increase shareholding can improve the quality of accounting information, and senior executives high proportion, along with the increase of shareholding accounting information quality just can be decreased.