The Impact Of Affiliated Management On Accounting Information Quality Of The Listed Companies In China

The enterprise group plays an important role in the development of national economy.With the continuous expansion of the scale,the problem of group governance becomes more and more obvious.Affiliated management is widely distributed in China.It is an important means for major shareholders to strengthen their control over listed companies.Is affiliated management a good way for the major shareholders to supervise the managers,or is it a means for the large shareholders to empty the listed companies and infringe the interests of the small shareholders? For this reason,the supervisory department has repeatedly issued written restrictions on large shareholders as senior managers because of the consideration of the interests of small and medium shareholders.For example,in 2002,the “Corporate Governance Principles for Listed Companies” promulgated by the China Securities Regulatory Commission.It require that senior members of listed companies such as general managers,deputy general managers,and financial directors can only serve as directors in large shareholders,and they cannot hold any other positions.Although the China Securities Regulatory Commission has been issuing regulations to restrict large shareholders from holding senior management positions,the actual impact is limited because there are no specific penalties.Because our country is still in the period of economic transformation,the level of investor protection is low,and the legal constraints are relatively weak.The role and impact of large shareholders' concurrent roles may be different from those of developed countries,and even bring additional negative effects.Based on the differences between these two economic consequences,Affiliated management has become a hot topic for scholars at home and abroad.At present,the research on executives at home and abroad mainly focuses on executives at the parallel level,chain executives and chain directors,and less research on the economic consequences of affiliated management of listed companies and their controlling shareholder verticals.Based on the principal-agent theory and the information asymmetry theory,this paper analyzes the two different economic consequences of China's affiliated management,and specifically studies the quality of accounting information of listed companies.Finally,through theoretical and empirical analysis,this paper puts forward suggestions for improving the quality of listed company's accounting information under affiliated management.Namely,through the promotion of the optimization of listed company's shareholding structure,the establishment and improvement of a multiple compensation system,the cautious appointment of large shareholders to the positions of senior managers of listed companies,the improvement of the information disclosure system of listed companies,and the rational use of the external supervision of the news media,etc.To strengthen the affiliated management "supervision effect",play its positive role of the public company accounting information quality,reduce the negative effect,improve the quality of accounting information of listed companies.Based on theoretical analysis and speculation,we believe that from the perspective of short-sightedness and support,there is a double effect of affiliated management on the quality of accounting information.The first major effect is the “supervisory effect,” and the second is the “hollowing effect,” which means that a vertically-employed senior manager may be the means by which large shareholders restrain the self-interest of management and strengthen the supervision of listed company managers.It is a means for large shareholders to control listed companies and obtain private benefits.The former means that senior executives are positively related to the quality of accounting information,while the latter implies a negative correlation between senior executives and corporate accounting information quality.Because both theories have their own logical rationality,this paper uses the modified Jones model to measure the quality of accounting information and establishes a hypothesis model.After processing,a total of 2,300 A-share listed companies were selected for the five-year period from 2012 to 2016 as a sample.In the research model,the accrued earnings as manipulability was taken as the explanatory variable.Affiliated management were the explanatory variables,and the scale of the company was The asset-liability ratio,total asset return rate,main business revenue growth rate,shareholding ratio of the largest shareholder,earnings per share,and two-term concurrent appointment serve as control variables.In an empirical investigation,in order to further analyze the different performances of vertical and concurrent executive results,we conducted a matching and in-depth study of the two positions of concurrent chairman and concurrent general manager to verify our hypotheses and conjectures.Through empirical test results,we find that affiliated management can reduce the company's earnings management behavior,that is,affiliated management more play a "supervision effect," and have a positive impact on the quality of corporate accounting information.We also found that through the comparison of positions,concurrently serving as a general manager position has a more significant effect on the quality of listed company accounting information than that of a concurrent chairman.This study examines the influence of concurrent executives on the quality of corporate accounting information from a vertical perspective.It not only provides a new research perspective for the factors affecting the quality of accounting information,but also helps us to fully understand large shareholders and concurrent executives in the enterprise and the role of group governance.At the same time,in practice,through the discussion of the two economic consequences,it will provide a new direction for follow-up supervision.This hasimportant practical significance for improving the level of accounting information of listed companies and promoting the healthy and orderly development of the capital market.