The Study Of Interest Game About Large Shareholders And Minority Shareholders In The Full Circulation Times

The problem of interest conflict between large shareholder and minorityshareholders has been the hot topics of research in the field of corporategovernance. The reform of non-tradable shares has changed the phenomenonwith shares of different right between tradable shareholders and non-tradableshareholders in China’s listed companies, The arrival of shares full circulationtime make the secondary market price to be a link connecting of the largeshareholder and minority shareholders’ interests. Minority shareholders have theopportunity to dialogue with the largest shareholder and can deterrence itthrough the right of capital voting in hands．So large shareholders and smallshareholders to form a real game of interest pattern in the full circulationtimes．The order of this research is to find the main influence factors of benefitgambling between large shareholders and minority shareholders，the gameequilibrium solution，suggestions and countermeasures．Research on this subjecthas important significance for improving corporate governance structure inChina，promoting the healthy development of securities market and protectingthe interests of investors．This article let the interests conflict between large shareholder andminority shareholders in the background of full circulation．Using the method oftheoretical analysis and case analysis to research． Firstly, Systematicallyelaborated the domestic and foreign scholars’ research results of relationshipbetween the concentration degree of equity and corporate governanceperformance through the literature review: Highly concentrated ownershipstructure can solve the agency problem. But at the same time also leads to theissue of interest conflict between large shareholders and minority shareholders.we can measure the degree that the major shareholder infringing company bythe control premium method and so on.This article combined with the policy effects of the reform on non-tradable shares, analyzed the new violations, trendsand its affecting factors of the major shareholders in circulation times: Thephenomenon of " only one big share " still exists，largest shareholder has thedual advantage of information and the shares，attribute of public oversight ofmanagement has not yet changed and violations of information disclosure.Andbuild two game models based on this analysis. From Clever Pig Game about thesupervision to management between large shareholder and minorityshareholders，we get the game Nash equilibrium is:large shareholder oversight,minority shareholders do not supervise. From the static games of completeinformation between large shareholder and minority shareholders, we get thegame Nash equilibrium is:the largest shareholder non infringe， minorityshareholders hold stock.And that has been confirmed by the equity transfer ofthe case of ShuangHui.This study indicates that, Firstly, when there is controlling majorshareholder, on one hand, the company’s ownership structure governance andperformance of the company’s interest has convergence effect. The other hand,when the large shareholder holding a larger proportion degree of separation ofownership and cash flow rights is low. Considering their own interests，largeshareholders will reduce the Infringement to minority shareholders，at this pointthe company rise in the value，interests of minority shareholders can be betterprotected. Secondly, in a large shareholder and minority shareholders’ interestsgame, whether the large shareholder choose violations is closely related to thestock market legal environment, if the law is the more perfect, more stringentenforcement，the illegal costs of large shareholder will increase，which issignificant to curb the violations of the major shareholders，However, the legalconstruction of China’s stock market is not perfect, cost of punishment forviolations of the largest shareholder is low, it is easy to lead to the expropriationeffect of large shareholder, while large shareholders against income is higherthan the punishment cost.Practice shows that, in shares circulation times, the violations of largeshareholders to minority shareholders still exist, and demonstrates the newfeatures and trends, however, minority shareholders can also use a hand vote oflegal significance and market behavior "voting with their feet" to resist and punish violations of the major shareholders in this game of interest. The last,author proposed improve the corporate governance structure, Continue topromote information disclosure system, and to enhance investor legislation toprotect, and improve the major shareholder of the cost of illegal, enhance thecrackdown and other policy recommendations. In order to provide some ideasand learn from for the study and Solution to related Issues.