The Effect Of Managerial Self-serving Behavior On The Voluntary Information Disclosure

Because of holding a lower proportion of managers, with the advantage of control,lacking of supervision of the shareholders, and that China’s regulatory system is imperfect;there be on-the-job consumption, over-investment acts of managers of listed companies inChina, to pursue their own interests. In recent years, voluntary information disclosuredraws the attention of the capital markets more and more. Managers as the main body ofthe voluntary information disclosure, will their self-serving behavior affect the decision ofvoluntary information disclosure, it will be worthy of our study. On the basis of domesticand foreign scholars, this paper first combed the relevant literature, including the voluntaryinformation disclosure and managerial self-serving behavior research, and analyzed intheory the effect of managerial self-serving behavior on voluntary information disclosure.Then, we selected the2007-2010A-share companies listed in Shanghai as the researchobject, and did an empirical test. Conclusions are as follows: First, if the degree of theon-the-job consumption of managers, the quality of voluntary information disclosure inlisted company will be worse; second, if the degree of over-investment of managersbecomes more and more serious, the quality of voluntary information disclosure will beworse. Finally, based on previous theoretical and empirical analysis, we suggested thatlisted companies in China should reasonably increase the stake of managers, strengthen theaudit and the evaluation of manager performance, and consider perfecting the managermarket, to reduce the damage that managers do to the shareholders’ interests, and thusstandardize the company’s voluntary information disclosure.