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Research On Pricing Policies Of Hybrid-channel Supply Chain Based On Asymmetric Cost Information

Posted on:2013-08-27Degree:MasterType:Thesis
Country:ChinaCandidate:X M FengFull Text:PDF
GTID:2249330374476124Subject:Industrial Engineering and Management Engineering
Abstract/Summary:PDF Full Text Request
With the development of IT applications and emergence of e-commerce, more and moreenterprises have opened direct marketing channels online on the basis of maintaining thetraditional distribution channels to sell goods, thus forming a mixed-channel supply chain.Pricing as one of the most important functions in the supply chain management, direct impacton product demand conditions and competitive advantage, it is that any business mustcomplete this work.Firstly, on the basis of previous research, using price factor, service factor, andconsumers of psychological factors to create a more realistic hybrid-channel demand function.Create the leading manufacturers Stackelberg game model and the leading retailersStackelberg game model under symmetric information for solving the optimal pricing strategyof the supply chain channel members. Through sensitivity analysis, we discuss the influenceof different parameters to the prices of manufacturers and retail channels of the game and givesome management advices. We study the influence to the hybrid-channel supply chain pricingunder different power structure.Then, through the establishment of the leading manufacturer Stackelberg game modeland the leading retailers Stackelberg game model under asymmetric cost information,analyzing the lying behavior of the supply chain members with information superiority,solving the optimal lied strategy and examines the false report behavior influence to the profitof members of the supply chain as well as the overall supply chain. The study found that theleader in the supply chain, even if it has the advantages of cost information, it will not liedabout cost, but who in a subordinate position has cost information advantages it will liedabout the cost to increase its own profits. The party lied behavior makes the profits of theother party and the whole supply chain to reduce. so it need to establish an incentivemechanism to make the party with information advantage to declare their real costinformation.Finally, summarize the findings of this article, and pointed out the limitations of thisstudy and the future research directions...
Keywords/Search Tags:hybrid-channel, supply chain, pricing, asymmetric cost information
PDF Full Text Request
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