How The Sepration Of The Ultimate Control And Cash Flow Rights Affect Enterprise Performance

A lot of unstandard behaviors of securities market is closely related toultimate control right．La Porta put forward the concept of ultimate controlright for the first time, he pointed out that，when we analyze the issue ofownership structure, we should find the ultimate controller through the chainof ownership, rather then simply to see the first major shareholder as thecontrolling shareholder. The control rights of ultimate controller often exceedtheir respective ownership in the company, which made ultimate controllerhave strong motivation through tunneling behavior to obtain private benefitsof control, and affect enterprise performance.In the presence of ultimate controller, Whether there is a relationshipbetween ultimate control rights and enterprise performance, how theseparation of the ultimate control and cash flow rights affect enterpriseperformance, this study attempts to answer these questions.The study chooses panel data of listed companies in the China’smanufacturing sector from2008to2010as research objects, and researchesthe above-mentioned issues through a combination method of theory analysisand normative study. The results show that, the control rights of the ultimate controller in the manufacturing sector and corporate performance is negativelycorrelated, that is, the lower control rights, the better enterprise performance;The separation of ultimate control and cash flow rights and enterpriseperformance don’t show a kind of significant linear relationship; In thesub-samples study, compared with the state-holding listed companies, listedprivate company have larger impact on enterprise performance.On the basis of empirical study, the study proposes relevant suggestionsand policies from the aspect of the supervision of listed companies and theprotection of medium and small shareholders.