An Study On The Effect Of The Growth Of Listed Companies To The Holdings Of The Institutional Investors

In the previous studies，there are many researches about the impacts of institutionalinvestors on the the governance of listed companies, with the conclusions that institutionalinvestors has gradually participated in the corporate governance, and the ownership of theinstitutional can effectively restrict earnings management, effectively promote R&Dinvestment, improve the quality of information disclosure and so on. However, few studiesare about the tendencies and preferences of institutional investors holding strategy. Whetherthe growth of the listed have the effects on the ownership strategies of institutional investors?What are the different factors influencing that different behavioral characteristics ofinstitutional investors’ holding strategy?From the perspective of institutional investors, the research is focus on the effect of thegrowth on their shareholding strategies. At the same time, this research takes the proxies thatstock volume as the company’s liquidity, market capitalization, the company risk index (Beta),corporate governance, stock balances, the nature of the controlling shareholder andinformation disclosure level as control variables. Then the paper divides the institutionalaccording to the Holding behavior characteristics (ownership concentration, ownershipturnover, holding sensitivity), and using the statistics tool:“Principal component analysis andcluster analysis” to classify the different institutional investors.Empirical data has shown that, if take the institutional investors as a whole, they are notsignificant on the company’s growth relationship. However, the regression results show thatinstitutional investors’ portfolio decisions tend to the companies with large scale, high degreeof information disclosure, big board size, proportion of independent directors, the checks andbalances role of the second largest shareholder to the tenth largest shareholders, low-riskmarket listed companies. In this paper, according on Bushee (1998) analysis of theinstitutional investors, they are classified as active institutional investors and passiveinstitutional investors, using the data statistics tool making the factor analysis and clusteranalysis methods. The result showed that14.54percent are active institutional investors,holding high concentration of ownership, low turnover rate and low transaction sensitivity.Further, for different types of institutional investors, the paper makes the regression analysisrespectively, with the founding that active institutional investors are passive significantly withgrowth sensitivity, while institutional investors do not have. After classification, theownerships of active investors have significantly relationships with whether independence between the manager of the company and chairman of the board, the largest proportion ofshareholding, the nature of controlling shareholder; positive institutional investors tend to getthe share that have independent investment manager and chairman, low proportion of thelargest shareholder, the non-state-owned controlling shareholder. Corresponding to itsshareholding characteristics, passive institutional investors’ ownership is not significant onthe growth of the corporate, corporate governance mechanism, the nature of the controllingshareholder. Relatively "loose" corporate governance structure and less stringent internalcontrols are more conducive to the managers to carry out short-term behavior, and createshort-term benefits, which also meet the psychological tendency of passive institutionalinvestors speculative. Policy can have a sense of motivation to guide positive institutionalinvestors holding, with the goal to optimise the operation of capital markets.