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An Analysis On The Evolution Of Banking Antitrust In The United States

Posted on:2013-07-04Degree:MasterType:Thesis
Country:ChinaCandidate:L L ZhangFull Text:PDF
GTID:2249330374981756Subject:Industrial Economics
Abstract/Summary:PDF Full Text Request
The object of this article is banking monopoly in the United States. Banking is a special industry, which provides liquidity for all enterprises and is the link of monetary policy. For this reason, the banking is not subject to the antitrust regulation in a long period. Since the1960s, the government began to pay attention to banking monopoly. Based on different banking cases, this article wants to explain the evolution process of banking antitrust in the United States and analyse the reasons of these problems.Case study is the research method used in this article. The author selects20representative cases, according to the monopoly type. This article focuses on the methods used in the judgment, the evolution of these methods, the differences between banking and traditional industries. This article also wants to find whether the attitude of Justice and courts changed to the same case. Based on these findings, the article summarizes the evolution and characteristics of banking.There are many types of monopoly in banking. This article focuses on the most important ones, which are exclusive deal, bundling sales, pricing agreements and concentrations. Sometimes banking antitrust is consistent with traditional industries, but it also has its own characteristics. Some standards are different, for example, the standard of market power is looser. Some behaviors are illegal in traditional industries, but it may be legal in banking, for example tying banking products and charging interchange fees. Some behaviors are legal in traditional industries, but it may be illegal in banking, for example conglomeration. Some characteristics only exist in banking, like dual regulation and method to definite relevant market.Finally, this article gives an explanation to the characteristics of banking antitrust. The characteristics of banking, the industry regulation and the Philadelphia National Bank case are the reasons why there are dual regulations in banking. The reason for the legality of interchange fees is the network externality of bilateral market. The reason for the legality of bundling banking business is that this kind of behavior has no negative effects on competition of banks and welfares of costumers. When it comes to the concentration cases, the methods to definite market power and relevant market are consistent with the banking development. The understanding of the causes of great depression is the main reason that conglomerate mergers are forbidden since1930s, and the changes of economic evironment forced the gorvenment to allow conglomerate mergers.
Keywords/Search Tags:Banking Monopoly, Exclusive Deal, Bundling, Interchange fees, BankMergers and Acquisitions, Case Study
PDF Full Text Request
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