| What's the internal relation between the monopoly mechanism and governmental regulations of Chinese banking business? Is the banking business under the pattern of open and competition still being monopolized and thus in demand of anti-monopoly regulations? It is hard to arrive at satisfying answers to these questions in the existing literature. What's more, as one inescapable problem in the process of marketization, the monopoly and regulation of banking business has great theoretical and practical significance in the case of China. Therefore, the core purpose of the present research is to systematically analyze the monopoly mechanism and investigate whether it produces negative extremities which affect competition, efficiency and equity, so as to provide theoretical supports and policy suggestions for governments to moderately construct anti-monopoly regulating mechanism.The present study innovatively puts forward a theoretical framework which analyses the relevance betweenmonopoly and regulating mechanism, and this framework can better accord with the unique monopoly model in Chinese banking business. Based on mechanism-designing theory, institutional economics and regime theory, the present study proposes five related theoretical assumptions. Judging the regulators'preferential assumption, the cost analysis and the game analysis, it explains the formational mechanism of monopoly and regulation as well as their relationship, thus comes to the conclusion.The primary research of the present study is to adopt the SCP analytical framework to verify the market structure, thus come to the conclusion that the Chinese banking market is still in the shadow of highly concentrated oligopoly model. Through systematic and historical investigation into the restrictions on the evolvement of Chinese banking monopoly mechanism, it is found that the three academic grasps are foundations formed by monopoly mechanism, the monopoly advantage of state-owned banks in the market competition because of the unequal allocation of financial resources under the national strategy of financial control preference, and restrictions on regulating mechanism reforms posed by the gaming of three interest groups. After analyzing the impact of the governmental regulation- which is a decisive variable- on the banking monopoly mechanism and market structure, the present study discovered that the banking monopoly under the super-economic power has obvious negative extremities, and these have charged regulating reform in banking high economic and social costs. Thus, the present research proposes the framework which helps reasonably regulate the Chinese banking and construct anti-monopoly mechanism in the next developmental phase.What's more, the present study creates a new term- the monopoly of super-economic power, which defines the monopoly formed by administrative power, business concession and unequal resource allocation. Accordingly, the present study defines the institutional origin of the monopoly mechanism in Chinese banking business as a monopoly of super-economic power shaped by the nation, which in China is a unique unity of ownership, managerial authority and regulation legislation. Within this framework, the negative external factors of monopoly in state-owned bank can be explained, as well as how the game of vested-interest groups deviate the governmental goal of maximizing the social welfare. Meanwhile, the present research also tentatively brings forward a proposition that citizens have equal entitlement to financial resources under the monopoly of super-economic power. The monopoly of super-economic power in Chinese banking infringe upon this entitlement in two aspects: 1, it weakens the local and agrarian finance, and directly causes the infringement of rights on financial resources of famers and the urban middle-low consumer groups including small and medium enterprises; 2, it also brings high economic cost, such as non-performing asset and sub-letting corruption, which violates the public rights on financial resources though national fiscal and monetary policy. This proposal provides a new angle to better understand the monopoly effects of Chinese banking business. |
